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Online public fora based on social media facilitate social interaction and 
synchronous online discussion. Social-media-based public fora resemble real-life 
political talks, and induce a larger number of and a wider variety of participants than 
blogs or Usenet newsgroups. By investigating two online groups centered on political 
discussions on Twitter, this study explores how information and influence flow, how 
diverse the actual discourse is, and to what extent the online groups communicate with 
the government.  
Using network analysis and content analysis/co-word analysis, this study has the 
findings as follows: In terms of the structural qualities, online public fora are relatively 
inclusive, but are centralized on a few participants and do not have a statistically 
significant indication of being equitable in discussion. The two-step flow of 
communication operates along with the presence of opinion leaders who turn out to be 
influentials but not content creators. Interestingly, the flow of influence is likely to be less 





of a given message rather than that of the author. In terms of the actual discourse, 
participants turn to like-minded fellow citizens’ remarks. Discourses are more emotional 
than cognitive and exhibits more anger than anxiety. Influential discourses are those with 
negative emotion more so than with positive emotion and those that are cognitive rather 
than emotional. Among cognitive components, assertive and strong discourses have 
greater social influence than analytical discourses. In terms of the interaction with the e-
government outlet, the distance between public authorities and private citizens is 
continuously present despite the decline of temporal and physical distance via the Internet.  
Based on the results, this study suggests a reconsideration of the Habermasian 
public sphere in online public fora. It contributes to the literature by empirically 
confirming the presence of the two-step flow of communication in online public fora and 
testing the difference between the flow of information and the flow of influence. In 
addition, it broadens the realm of research on political communication by exploring not 
only sources/ideological perspectives but also emotional/cognitive aspects in discussions. 
Methodologically, structure/context, multi-level, and quantitative/qualitative analyses 
allow this study to have a comprehensive account of online public fora. Practically, this 
study proposes to improve the interactivity with citizens as the next stage of e-
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
WHY ONLINE PUBLIC FORA?  
Media play a critical role in the process of democracy. They are presumed to 
provide a wide range of perspectives and opinions to a mass public which has limited 
resources to gather information and share opinions. Normatively, mass media offer 
diverse viewpoints, help people to make informed political decisions, and contribute to 
forming public opinions (Baker, 1997; Benkler, 2006). Through properly functioning 
media, an informed citizenry can be nurtured, increase civic engagement, and ultimately 
lead to a better democratic society. However, some have argued that the contemporary 
mass media in fact have represented a limited intake of opinions (Benkler, 2006) and 
have been overly susceptible to advertisers’ influence (Baker, 1997). The public have not 
been allowed to have full speech rights in both broadcast and print media (Stein, 2006). 
The Frankfurt School’s broader argument that mass media reduced the public to 
consumers and failed to provide the public a public sphere to express and share opinions 
has had a growing chorus of agreement from various critics (Habermas, 1989).  
These limitations of conventional mass media for social mediation might or might 
not be complemented by various services on the Internet which have emerged as a new 
venue to discuss politics (Castells, 2007). In the 2011 report of the State of the News 
Media (Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2011), it was only 
online news that gained more readers compared to the previous year, while all other 





their audiences. Among social network sites’ (hereafter SNSs) users who also go online 
to seek for news, 51% obtained news items from people whom they “follow” (Purcell, 
Rainie, Mitchell, Rosenstiel, & Olmstead, 2010). According to the Pew Internet and 
American Life Project (Smith, 2009), 74% of Internet users, i.e. over the half of entire 
adult population in the U.S., went online to both communicate about politics as well as to 
obtain news during the 2008 election. As noted in the above survey results, the Internet 
has become more and more influential in the flow of political information in our daily life 
(Bucy & Gregson, 2001; Neuman, Bimber, & Hindman, 2011). This growing reliance on 
the Internet for information gathering and political discourse was described as “(C)ivil 
society is moving to the Internet” (Levine, 2004, p.79). The Internet has drawn attention 
as a “new, all-inclusive forum for deliberation, information gathering, and exchanges 
among citizens” (Hardy & Scheufele, 2005, p.73). 
Along with the growing use of the Internet for political purposes, the question of 
whether the Internet functions as a public sphere where public opinions rise through the 
exchange of information and discussions or simply a public space where anybody can 
rant and rave remains to be answered. As for the democratic potential of the Internet use, 
previous studies have had complicated answers: Online political discussions, not online 
information seeking itself, were found to be an important moderator to enhance political 
involvement; Not only selective exposure to like-minded opinions but also inadvertent 
exposure to cross-cutting ideologies seem to exist concurrently in the new media 
environment. In addition, studies that directly compare online public fora to Habermas’s 





sphere, whereas some studies see the potential of online public fora as a new, networked 
public sphere. These mixed possibilities of online public fora in functioning as a public 
sphere as well as the importance of a public sphere in the practice of democracy 
motivated the present study to examine the structural quality and content of online 
political discussions. 
In the present study, online public fora are defined as a place for sharing 
information and discussion about certain topics (Choi & Park, forthcoming). Compared 
to face-to-face meetings, it lessens temporal, spatial, and cost barriers and consequently 
promotes participation in the forum. The earlier online fora were in the forms of bulletin 
board system, electronic mailing lists (Listserv), community network on Freenet, and 
Newsgroups on Usenet, which enabled users to post messages in public message boards 
and exchange e-mails with other users. Later on, online public fora became more 
synchronous and interactive based on social media such as Facebook and Twitter. 
 
PURPOSE, SIGNIFICANCE, AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study examines the structure of political discussion networks, the flows of 
information and influence, and the content of political discussions, using both network 
analysis and content analysis. Specifically, the difference between the flow of 
information and the flow of influence, the characteristics of opinion leaders, the forms 
(emotional/cognitive), sources, and ideological perspectives of content, and the extent to 





empirically examining both the structure and content of the online public fora in the 
public sphere context, we can characterize how well the Internet is able to contribute to 
meaningful political discourse. 
Five aspects distinguish this study from previous studies on online political 
discussion. First, it focuses on political discussions taken place on SNSs. Currently, few 
studies have been done on SNSs in the political communication context. Most are based 
on overall Internet use such as searching for information, reading articles, and discussing 
politics. Some address specific platforms such as blogs and Usenet, but, these are neither 
synchronous nor accessible as much as SNSs are: Blogs and Usenet are geared to posting 
comments rather than synchronous social interaction, and they have a limited number of 
participants, compared to SNSs (Gaines & Mondak, 2009). SNSs facilitate civic 
interaction and discussions about politics which can be an important route toward further 
political participation. Second, this study explores the actual discourse to which 
participants are exposed. Previous studies have been based on survey results which rely 
on respondents’ recollection of prior experiences or perceptions of online chatting. It was 
rarely the content but mostly the contact or perception of content that they measured. 
Third, the actual discourse’s emotional and cognitive components are investigated. While 
the recent literature in political communication has paid attention to emotions such as 
anxiety and anger, not much has been done in regards to cognitive aspects such as 
causation and assertion. By investigating both aspects, the expressive or rational qualities 
of discourse can be discovered. Fourth, the interaction between online public fora and the 





research. Previous studies mostly focused on the discursive dimension of the public 
sphere, specifically whether the discussion is deliberative or not. However, since the 
public sphere should catalyze public opinions and inform the government of these 
opinions, the relationship with the government is an important facet of a public sphere. 
Lastly, both structure and content of the discussion network are investigated in this study, 
whereas most studies addressed only one of the two. Studies that focus on the structure 
examine structural qualities such as degree distributions and network size, and those that 
conduct content analysis explore issues such as users’ intentions, emotional reactions, 
and content sources. Exploring both, we can have a better understanding of the online 
public fora and the overall dynamics of information flow without sacrificing the 
granularity of content. The present study contributes to the literature by exploring the 
actual, political discussions of online communities based on Twitter, one of the popular 
SNSs, and people’s interactions with e-government outlets, based on both network 
analysis and content analysis. 
This study purposely uses the term “discussion,” instead of other somewhat 
similar terms such as “conversation” and “debate.” Key differences among the three are 
whether verbal communication is issue-oriented or not, whether it is private or non-
private, and whether it is formal or informal. Since the online communities investigated 
here have detailed conversations centered on politics, they are more public than ordinary 
“conversation” and less formal than most “debates;” therefore this study uses the word 





As for the scope of this study, discussions such as the digital divide in terms of 
technological access, commercialization of the online space, information filtering by a 
few search engines, and demographic attributes of online participants (Dahlberg, 2001; 
Hindman, 2009; Papacharissi, 2002) are not considered, since the analyses of the present 
study are focused on online groups and the flows of information and influence within 
those groups. Additionally, the term “online” in this study is not intended to make a 
distinction from “offline (or real)” but to indicate one form of communication mediated 
by technology. The dichotomized separation between online and offline is likely to reify 
online activities into another world, rather than regarding them as a continuum of our 
everyday life (Bakardjieva, 2003). Instead of drawing the line between online and offline 
realms, which more critics concede does not exist, this study regards online discussion as 
one form of technology-mediated communication. By focusing on online discussions, 
political conversations shared in the face-to-face context are not addressed, restricting the 
interpretation of research results to computer-mediated communication. However, this 
limitation does not undermine the significance of the present research, since online 
political discussion has been found to be a stronger predictor of both online and offline 
political participation than face-to-face political conversation (see Cho et al., 2009; Price, 
2009; Shah, Cho, Eveland, and Kwak, 2005). 
Previous studies found a positive association among online information seeking, 
online political discussion, and political participation
1
: The more one seeks information 
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 Political participation here includes such activities as voting, writing letter to the governor, 





online and participates in political discussion online, the more one participates in political 
activities. Within this big picture of the known relationship among online information use, 
online political discussion, and political participation, the present study examines online 
political discussion based on social media and explores the flows of information and 
influence, opinion leadership, and the interaction with e-government outlets. In addition, 
this study examines the actual discourse shared in online public fora in terms of sources, 
ideological perspectives, and the forms of discourse (emotional/cognitive), an inquiry 
inspired by the cognitive dissonance theory and affective intelligence theory. The 
findings are discussed in the context of civil society in relation to Habermas’s public 
sphere theory. 
In the next chapter, the theoretical foundation of the present study is introduced 
through a literature review examining the relationship between civil society and the 
Internet. It also explains the unique opportunities that social media provide for this 
research to explore online public fora, whereas many previous studies examined the 
general use of the Internet or the bulletin-board style postings of Usenet and blogs. In 
addition, it discusses the notion of the public sphere and formulates research questions 
and hypotheses related to the constituents of the public sphere. Chapter 3 illustrates the 
research setting, case selection, methods, and specific analysis plan, including research 
questions and hypotheses. In Chapter 4, research results are explained in three sections: 
network, content, and interaction with the e-government outlet. Based on these results, 
discussion on rethinking the Habermasian notion of the public sphere in online public 





practical implications as well as limitations and suggestions for future research, followed 




















Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET  
 Many studies have discussed the impact of Internet use on our society in the 
context of democratic processes. Among the main questions in the literature are whether 
the new media environment contributes to increasing political participation and whether 
it increases the selective exposure to similar ideologies, the so-called “echo chamber 
effect.” The current chapter first explores the literature in regards to the behavioral aspect 
of Internet use, such as how people seek political information and discuss politics, and 
the effect of these behaviors on political involvement. It also illustrates that previous 
studies have uncovered the phenomenon of selective exposure to congenial content as 
well as inadvertent exposure to conflicting opinions on the Internet. This literature review 
on behavioral and content-wise aspects prompts the discussions in  next sections on how 
new research can fill gaps in the literature and make a contribution to our understanding 
of online public fora. 
Several studies have examined how the behavior of seeking information or 
discussing political issues on the Internet affects political participation. By comparing 
mass media use to the Internet use, Shah et al. (2005) found that online information 
seeking and online messaging had a greater effect on civic engagement, rather than mass 
media use for informational purposes. This tendency was also confirmed in Kenski and 
Stroud (2006) who found positive relationships between online exposure to campaign 





relevant articles produced during the period of 1998 to 2007 (Boulianne, 2009) also 
found that the literature demonstrates a positive effect of Internet use on political 
engagement, a tendency also confirmed by other more recent studies (see Gil De Zuniga, 
Puig-I-Abril, & Rojas, 2009; Kushin & Yamamoto, 2008).  
In addition to online information seeking as a predictor of political participation, 
online political discussions were found to be a significant factor moderating the 
relationship between online information seeking and political participation (Hardy & 
Scheufele, 2005). Two panel studies of political discussion groups (Price, 2009) also 
demonstrated that online participants turned out to have significantly higher social trust, 
civic engagement, and political participation, compared to non-participants. Seeing the 
importance of political discussion, Cho et al. (2009) theorized that interactive political 
messaging as a process of ‘reasoning’ could be a bridge between the ‘stimuli’ of news 
use and the ‘response’ through democratic outcomes. They found that online messaging 
had a greater explanatory power in predicting political participation than offline political 
discussion. These studies all controlled predispositions of individuals such as political 
interest and participation by including them as control variables or performing panel 
studies, in order to reject the possibility of reverse causality that people politically active 
engage in online discussions rather than online discussions increase political participation. 
Similar findings were reported with respect to China in Yang’s (2003) analysis; with a 
nascent civil society in China
2
, online debates helped to better inform citizens, articulate 
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 Despite the digital inequality and censorship in China, the gap between information haves and 
have-nots is declining, and Internet users have developed their own strategies to circumvent 





social problems, and increase the chance of political actions. These results suggest that 
neither the online information seeking itself (Scheufele & Nisbet, 2002) nor the 
frequency of Internet use (Jennings & Zeitner, 2003), but online interaction with fellow 
citizens contributes more to increases in political involvement. This conclusion is in line 
with the literature that has found interpersonal discussion to be an important factor for 
political engagement (McLeod, Scheufele, & Moy, 1999).  
The relationship between political discussion and political engagement tends to 
create a positive feedback loop. According to the cognitive mediation model (Eveland, 
2001), those seeking surveillance gratification pay more attention to news and are likely 
to undergo elaborative processing of the news, and consequently end up with more 
political knowledge. This elaboration which means linking new information to one’s 
memory can be facilitated by discussions with others. The citizen communication 
mediation model (Shah et al., 2005) further specifies the mediation of online and offline 
discussions among citizens between news consumption and political participation. 
Embracing the above two models, Cho et al. (2009) proposes the O-S-R-O-R model by 
adding the first R to the earlier O-S-O-R model. The first O stands for the reception 
situation of audiences such as structural, cultural, motivational, and cognitive status, and 
S represents stimuli such as exposure to news. R denotes reasoning process such as 
mental elaboration and discussions on the stimuli, O means outcome orientations, and the 
last R signifies responses or outcomes such as political knowledge and participation (Cho 
et al., 2009). Considering elaboration processing addressed in the cognitive mediation 





Cho et al. found that news use and political knowledge/participation are mediated by 
reasoning and online/offline political discussions. This line of research illuminates the 
importance of discussion about politics in both online and offline settings. In particular, 
online political discussions were found to be a stronger predictor of political participation 
than offline political discussions. 
While joining online discussions tends to increase political participation, it does 
not necessarily lead one to encounter diverse opinions or content. Adamic and Glance 
(2005) observed a divided blogosphere between liberal and conservative bloggers and 
rarely found cross-links between blogs of the two camps. Hargittai, Gallo, and Kane 
(2007) also supported this tendency, although concomitantly patterns of linking like-
minded others’ blogs did not increase over time. In Stroud (2008), a cross-sectional 
analysis and a panel analysis on the relationship between ideology and political Internet 
use found that people are highly likely to visit websites that match their own political 
predisposition. These findings prompt us to consider Sunstein’s formulation (2007):  he 
argues that the balkanization of opinions has been promoted by the Internet which 
facilitates opportunities to filter content. In his view, online fora are nothing more than 
echo chambers of like-minded people, as also argued by Wilhelm (1998).  
However, unlike the former findings, Kelly, Fisher, and Smith (2006), analyzing 
the political discussion groups of the Usenet found many interconnections between 
groups with different political orientations. Based on a survey of users of online chat 
rooms or discussion boards, Wojcieszak and Mutz (2009) found that cross-cutting 





in political online groups. This “inadvertency” of exposure to different political views in 
online settings has been supported by a series of recent studies (Brundidge, 2010a; Kim, 
2011). Brundidge (2010a) in particular found that online political discussion increased 
the exposure to political heterogeneity through a survey encompassing both Internet users 
and non-users. Marginalized groups, often silent in broader political discussion, are 
expressing their voices and empowering themselves using the Internet, as depicted by 
Mehra, Merkel, and Peterson Bishop (2004).   
From a psychological perspective, the selective exposure phenomenon stems from 
the drive to reduce cognitive dissonance by avoiding information that conflicts with one’s 
committed position and that is difficult to refute (Festinger, 1964). This behavior leads 
people to be engaged in biased information seeking to maintain cognitive stability (Jonas, 
Schulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005). Later, selective exposure to supporting information was 
found to be not equivalent to selective avoidance of challenging information (Garrett, 
2009), which reconciles the seemingly contrasting arguments between selective exposure 
and “inadvertent encounter” hypotheses. People favor and selectively choose congenial 
content, but do not intentionally avoid and sometimes do encounter conflicting content. 
This is why selective exposure to like-minded content is more prevalent than selective 
avoidance to challenging content. A different explanation is given by the affective 
intelligence theory which explains that the selective exposure phenomenon is contingent 
upon emotions (Marcus, MacKuen, & Neuman, 2011): Anxiety was positively associated 
with seeking challenging information and willingness to compromise, whereas aversion 





If a person is angry about a certain issue, he or she tends to search for like-minded 
opinions, whereas when anxious, one tends to learn more about a given issue and be more 
open to conflicting information. 
Taken together, the studies discussed above agree that the Internet provides a 
place for political discussions, irrespective of their approaches and methods. However, 
how online public fora contribute to democracy seems to have complicated answers, 
which could be summarized as follows: From the behavioral aspect, online political 
discussions with fellow citizens contribute to increasing political engagement; however, 
simply going online and finding political information does not necessarily mean that one 
is more politically engaged. From the content-wise aspect, the new media environment 
might facilitate selective exposure to like-minded ideas, but it also could facilitate 
unintended encounters with heterogeneous opinions, which is affected by cognitive and 
emotional processes. 
Based on the review of the relevant literature, the theoretical framework of the 
present research is depicted in Figure 1. Given the previous findings of the relationship 
among ‘online information seeking,’ ‘online political discussion,’ and ‘political 
participation,’ this study situates in ‘online political discussion’ by investigating 
discussions in social-media-based public fora which might increase political participation 
and also examines their interaction with the government which might be attributable to 
online political discussion. In addition, this study explores the content of the discussion  








Figure 1: Theoretical Framework of the Research 
Note: Gray squares denote the areas that the present study investigates. The dotted line is not a 





SOCIAL MEDIA FOR POLITICAL DISCUSSION  
On top of the previous findings, this research brings social media into the 
literature of political communication. Observing that SNSs are permeating our daily 
political engagement in terms of sharing information and discussing politics, the present 
study attempts to enrich the literature by examining online groups in social network 
settings as they engage in political discussions. This chapter explains the function of 
social media in the context of civil society.  
Considering the importance of online political discussions as an enhancer for 
political participation, SNSs, where more participation and lively discussions might take 
place than on blogs or online bulletin boards, could be an important venue for further 
investigation in the context of civil society (Mutz & Young, 2011). Studies that examined 
SNSs in their early years focused on the debate of social capital, online social support, 
and privacy (boyd & Ellison, 2007). The political impact of SNSs has been featured in 
online activism or social movement literature (McCaughey & Ayer, 2003), but not in the 
political communication context. At present, a few studies (see Gil de Zuniga, 2012; 
Halpern & Lee, 2011; Johnson, Zhang, Bichard, & Seltzer, 2010) have explored the 
influence of SNSs in regards to political communication. While much political 
communication research has addressed the role of overall Internet use, types of typical 
online behaviors, or postings on specific platforms such as Usenet and blogs, SNSs 





First, Usenet and blogs are platforms for “asynchronous threaded, bulletin-board 
style discussion,” whereas SNSs are a platform for “synchronous online discussion” 
which better facilitates social interaction and conversation (Neuman et al., 2011, p.34). 
Second, compared to Usenet and blogs, a larger number of and a wider variety of 
participants join SNSs (Gaines & Mondak, 2009). Third, unlike many political blogs that 
are invisible and left unread except for a few A-list bloggers’ postings, political 
discussion in SNSs is less subject to this problem since it is based in social networks, an 
additional layer of relationship. Fourth, given that politics are discussed with those in 
one’s social network, they resemble something more like real-life political talks, 
compared to other platforms. Fifth, SNSs allow the researcher to have samples not 
limited to college students, on which many previous studies relied (Gil de Zuniga, 2012).  
From a content-wise aspect, another advantage of exploring political discussion in 
SNSs is that the ‘actual’ content discussed among participants can be investigated, rather 
than ‘perceived’ content recollected by survey respondents. Studies related to selective 
exposure to like-minded content have not actually measured ‘content’ shared in real 
discussions, but rather relied on respondents’ memories of content shared or ‘contact’ 
with others: How frequently do you discuss politics with people who have extreme right 
or left views, who are Democrats or Republicans, and who have different races or 
ethnicities (Brundidge, 2010a) ? As illustrated, studies depended on reports of the 
perceptions on past experiences or those with whom people were having political 





communication on social media allows the researcher to directly tackle the discourse and 
examine the diversity of content shared in a real context. 
Among SNSs, this study chose Twitter for the following reasons. Twitter has been 
regarded as primarily public and available for users to read interested or relevant content 
(Marwick & boyd, 2010) without barriers to sign in or requests for being “friends.” It is a 
realm where interpersonal communication and mass communication integrate. Twitter 
also facilitates anytime-anywhere connection through its application for mobile devices 
(Lee, Cha, & Park, 2010; Parmelee & Bichard, 2011). The 140-character-limit of Twitter 
appears not to be detrimental to discussions, since this short posting tends to promote fast 
responsiveness and facilitates conversations, especially inasmuch as Twitter is available 
on multiple devices. Moreover, Twitter users can post long Tweet messages without any 
word limits via Twitlonger.com. Other communicative functions such as “intertextuality,” 
“transmediality,” and “intermediality” help to have political discussions on Twitter (Caja, 
Mark,  & Einspänner, 2012): The @ sign allows for maintaining coherence among 
Tweets (intertextuality), as confirmed by Honeycutt and Herring (2009); hyperlinks 
embedded in Tweets help traverse to other media (transmediality or traversability 
(Brundidge, 2010b)), and audio-visual aids enhance effective communication 
(intermediality). While some of these features are shared with other SNSs, Twitter is 
more public, more open, and more accessible, all of which are conducive to public 
discussions, and it appears to have found solid footing among communities of people 
interested in politics, the core subject in this dissertation. It also allows the researcher to 





Investigation on Twitter can illuminate flows of online communication that probably 
would exist on other modalities.  
 
PUBLIC SPHERE AND ONLINE PUBLIC FORA 
While the previous chapters discussed the importance of investigating political 
discussions in SNSs and the actual content of discussions, this chapter focuses on the 
discursive dimension of online public fora. It first introduces the notion of the public 
sphere as defined by Habermas and next addresses the limitations of the Habermasian 
public sphere, followed by an alternative interpretation of its conception. By opening up 
to both Habermasian and alternative perspectives, the current study derives research 
questions about the flows of information and influence and the diversity of content, 
which are primary constituents of the public sphere.    
According to Habermas (1989; 1996, p.360), between the civil society and the 
state stands the public sphere, “a network for communicating information and points of 
view,” to inform the state with the needs of the civil society. In the 17th and 18th 
centuries, salons and coffee houses served as a public sphere where social intercourse 
reached across the strata of the middle class and where criticism about cultural 
production and politics was centered, a sphere independent from public authorities and 
government hierarchies. Habermas (2006) argues that in such spheres, public opinion can 
be formed through critical and rational debate, and this deliberation can be supported by 





While striking an important chord within the cadre of scholars and critics 
examining how public opinion is manifest and how political opinions take shape, the 
Habermasian notion of public sphere operations based on rational and deliberative debate 
has been criticized for being an ideal (Garnham, 1992) and ignoring the existence of 
multiple public spheres of counterpublics (Fraser, 1992). In the Habermasian public 
sphere, the discursive rationalism on which the elites have been trained is favored and 
other modes of symbolic expression such as parody and humor are disregarded (Dahlgren, 
2005). Several scholars criticize Habermas’s theory for failing to bridge the public 
spheres and for his highly utopian conception of democratic society. McCarthy (1992), 
for example, argues that consensus based on demonstrative and rational arguments cannot 
be possible, since there are no universal norms applicable to every case, and Schudson 
(1992) illustrates that the Habermasian model has not been realized in American political 
history.  
Previous research on online public fora, based on perspective of the Habermasian 
notion of the public sphere, had negative conclusions regarding their impact on 
democracy (see Table 1). They pointed out that online public fora are filled with lower 
quality of discourse, enclave communication, trivial/episodic content, partisan/celebrity 
politics, and narcissism/agonism/commercialism without gaining attention from policy 
makers. However, studies that did not limit their conceptual basis to Habermas’s rational-
critical deliberation had explanations contrary to the ones above. They illustrated that 
online public fora have higher equality, more traversibility to other modes of 

























Detrimental to democracy Beneficial to democracy 
 Degenerating the public sphere by 
lowering the quality of discourse along 
with the increase in the quantity of 
discursive participation (Habermas, 1989) 
 Allowing systematic and individualized 
filtering of information and fostering 
“daily me” and “echo-chamber” of like-
minded people (Sunstein, 2007) 
 Far from the Habermasian model of the 
public sphere, since testimony, story-
telling, greetings, and audio-visual modes 
of communication dominate the 
networked public sphere, rather than the 
rational-critical deliberation (Loader & 
Mercea, 2011) 
 Composed of populist rhetoric, 
extremism, and celebrity politics (Loader 
& Mercea, 2011) 
 Filled with “narcissistically derived, 
civically beneficial expressions of 
political opinion,” “subversive actions 
articulated in discourse that emphasizes 
plurality and agonism,” and “privately 
generated narratives published in 
commercially public spaces” 
(Papacharissi, 2009, p.244) 
 Failing to draw attention of policy 
decision makers (Hurwitz, 2003; Jenkins 
& Thorburn, 2003) 
 More egalitarian without having social 
cues, more open in exchanging ideas, 
more conducive to having intimate and 
direct questions, and more comfortable to 
express disagreements, compared to face-
to-face discussions (Price, 2009) 
 Enhanced “traversability” (Brundidge, 
2010b) across communicative spaces, 
which increases the strength of the link 
between information and action (Delli 
Carpini & Keeter, 2003) 
 Increased communicative reflexivity of 
the public to revisit, reconsider, and 
respond to perceived public opinions 
through the access to fellow citizens’ 
opinions and group judgments 
(Friedland, Hove, & Rojas, 2006) 
 Forming a networked public sphere with 
many sub-groups of mutual interest and 
with non-market, peer-produced 
alternative sources of filtration and 
accreditation, instead of being 
manipulated by a few voices as in the 
mass-media-dominated public sphere 
(Benkler, 2006) 
 More chance given to people with poor 
political resources to join the democratic 
process, fostering participatory political 
culture (Loader & Mercea, 2011) 
 Enabling the public to access to 
government and political information, 
monitor governments and corporate 
interests, expand connection to weak ties, 
and disseminate information (Loader & 
Mercea, 2011) 
 
Table 1: The Impact of Online Public Fora on Democracy from the Perspective of the 





As denoted in the clear contrast between studies that adhered to Habermas’s 
conception and those that eased its definitional boundary, empirical studies that examined 
the extent to which online political conversation meets the criteria for deliberativeness 
commonly found that online political conversation falls short (for review, see Eveland, 
Morey, & Hutchens (2011)). This negative finding seems to be somewhat pre-determined 
by comparing online public fora to the ideal public sphere. That ideal notion of a 
deliberative public sphere can disregard the real context or the everyday life settings 
where political discussions take place with less rational and serious intent. This concern 
was well reflected in Eveland et al. (2011, p.1086):  
The deliberative framing of political conversation research can lead to unrealistic 
expectations about the function of political conversation in the lives of individuals, 
and possibly undue attention to certain aspects of political conversation to the 
relative exclusion of others. 
Seeing the limitation of Habermas’s theory in explaining emerging online public 
fora, Papacharissi (2009) posited Habermas’s model as a normative, theoretical construct 
that people pursue and that cannot be empirically found or tested. The author argued that 
online public fora are not a “public sphere” but a “public space”: It is not for deliberation 
or rational-critical discourse, but for political expression; it is not independent from 
external forces, but does intermingle with commerce, where it may be hard to discern 
public and private realms. Papacharissi (2009), by regarding Habermas’s model as a 
metaphor, avoids the possible deadlock in explaining the democratic potential of online 
public fora that do not fit the Habermasian public sphere but might have a positive impact 





1971) of Habermas’s model if it only serves the role of a metaphor. No one might 
disagree that deliberation is desirable in a normative sense. If Habermas’s model does not 
contribute any more than simply confirming this norm, it loses its theoretical value and 
validity. However, up to the present, much literature has treated Habermas’s model as a 
theory which can be empirically tested. Moreover, considering online public fora as a 
public space, as suggested by Papacharissi, does not help to consider facets of the public 
sphere hidden in Habermas’s model that still may be valuable for democracy. The 
concept of public space does not convey civil society, nor does it relate the private and 
the public realms. The relegation of the Habermasian public sphere as a metaphor and 
online public fora as a public space seems to hinder the theoretical development of the 
public sphere and our understanding of online public fora in the context of the democratic 
process. 
Instead of dismissing the Habermasian notion of the public sphere, several studies 
illustrate different responses to Habermas’s model: One is to update the theory based on 
its current form, and the other is to shed light on uncovered aspects of Habermas’s public 
sphere. Among studies that proposed a theoretical update of Habermas’s model, 
Friedland et al. (2006) mentioned that the Habermasian model of the public sphere needs 
to be improved by considering the rise of the networked public sphere. Facilitated by 
information and communication technologies, the communicative power of ordinary 
citizens has been increased, which allows civic interaction without the mediation of mass 
media. In addition, the networked public sphere can complement deliberation through 





group judgments. In these regards, the authors argue that the Habermasian public sphere 
needs to embrace the networked public. The other tendency of political communication 
research on public spheres focuses on emotional expressions rather than rational 
deliberation in online public fora. Several studies explain that political conversations in 
everyday life do not resemble rational-critical discourse, and they are more likely to be in 
the form of emotionally appealing remarks and expressives. Branching out from the 
heavy reliance of political communication research on deliberative theory, studies in 
recent years have started to examine the use of expressives (Graham 2010) or outrage 
(Sobieraj & Berry 2011), by considering that emotional appeals can highlight particular 
issues and promote political participation.  
On top of these discussions, Dahlgren (2005) suggests a new conception of the 
public sphere, embracing online public fora as a networked public sphere and not 
privileging rational-critical deliberation over emotional expressions. According to 
Dahlgren (2005), irrespective of the form of deliberation in discussions, horizontal 
communication prompted by civic interaction promotes civic cultures, which close the 
distance from political participation by creating a venue for freely sharing information 
and opinions. In this vein, civic interaction itself is important, since this daily interaction, 
not deliberation per se, can contribute to forming collective identities and mobilizing 
social actions (Choi & Park, 2012). This perspective is supported by Shah et al. (2005). 
They consider that it is not so much the nature of the discussion, but the discussion or 
interaction itself that might stimulate participation. Online interaction can elicit new 





traditional forms of interaction (Shah et al., 2005). Standing out of the ideal frame of the 
deliberative public sphere, the Internet as a potential place for political discussions and a 
barometer of public opinion can provide symbolic empowerment to civil society and 
promote active civic involvement, rather than simply passive spectatorship (Bucy & 
Gregson, 2001). 
This perspective can be traced back to Dewey (1927, p.208) who put less stress on 
the knowledgeable competence of the public in making political judgment than on the 
“improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion” of 
the public. In this regard, online public fora can provide another venue for civic 
interaction and political expression and constitute another form of public sphere. Taken 
together, while most previous studies (see Eveland et al, 2011) have applied the theory of 
deliberation to assess political conversations, the present study acknowledges both 
conceptions of public sphere made by Habermas and Dahlgren: Rather than assuming 
rational deliberation is an essential factor for constituting public sphere, this study opens 
up the possibility of having non-conventional forms of a public sphere.  
Compared to a mass-media-based public sphere, online public fora seem to play 
the role of social mediation better in the sense that they are more open to access
3
 and less 
susceptible to governmental or corporate forces (Himelboim, 2010), although they might 
be far from the ideal public sphere. The main concerns are how the information and 
                                                             
3
 This study acknowledges that limitations to access to online public fora still exist for those who 
do not have Internet connections or digital skills. Nonetheless, compared to the mass-media-based 
public sphere where speech rights of the public are constrained, online public fora provide much 





influence are spread across people, what content is actually shared among them, and 
whether they communicate with the government in online public fora. In the following 
sections, research questions about the discussion structure of online groups, the flows of 
information and influence from who to whom, the actual discourse shared among 
participants, and the interaction with the e-government outlet are examined.  
 
Structure of Online Political Discussion Network  
The egalitarian architecture of the Internet was expected to promote many-to-
many interactions and less inequality in terms of participating in online public fora. 
However, findings of several studies do not support this expectation. Himelboim (2008) 
investigated 30 Usenet newsgroups of politics and health and found that the number of 
replies and posts has highly skewed distributions irrespective of topics. The 
disproportional distribution of the number of messages is identified in another sample of 
Usenet newsgroups of politics by finding the existence of a power-law distribution 
(Himelboim, 2010). This heavy-tailed distribution (i.e., a few people responsible for most 
of the messages) is also found in Wikipedia discussion pages where only a few 
discussions have drawn several thousand chains of sub-threads (Laniado, Tasso,  
Volkovichz, & Kaltenbrunner, 2011). Overall, most people neither post messages nor 
have replies and only a few have several posts and replies in the newsgroups. 
While a skewed distribution of posts and replies might suggest the limited 





Investigating Usenet newsgroups, Fisher, Smith, and Welser (2006) illustrate that reply 
rates and being-replied-to rates are similar for most participants. Not only does the 
relationship between replies given and replies received exhibit statistically significant 
correlations, but also the relationship between messages posted and replies received has 
similarly significant correlations with each other (Himelboim, 2008; 2010). These results 
might indicate the quality of equality in the sense that people who actively participate in 
the discussions are those who also get the most attention from others. Although the term 
“equality” is difficult to define and measure, the phenomenon of investing more and 
getting back more might imply that online public fora are less distracted by external cues 
such as socioeconomic status, education, and social connections and prone to allow 
participants to focus simply on the discussion at hand.  
Unlike these studies based on asynchronous postings on Usenet, more 
investigations need to be done to learn how political discussion takes place in the setting 
of synchronous interaction, which better facilitates discussion and which is more 
characteristic of contemporary Internet opportunities. Specifically, by examining the 
structure of discussion networks, questions such as how many people are isolated from 
the discussion, how much the discussion is concentrated on a few participants, and  the 
equity in the process of sending and receiving comments can be addressed.  
RQ1. What is the structure of the discussion network that takes place among 






Flows of Information and Influence 
 As depicted by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), mass media research has been 
interested in the effect of the mass media on opinions and attitudes, and several theories 
have attempted to explain the flow of communication between media and the mass. 
Among those early theories, was the so-called hypodermic needle theory or magic bullet 
theory which was advocated by Lasswell (1948). This perspective assumes a strong effect 
of mass media by affecting audiences directly and immediately, on which the model of 
source-message-channel-receiver is based. It was criticized for focusing on the 
unidirectional linearity from media to audience and for ignoring interpersonal relations 
which might mediate media messages.  
Given this limitation, Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948) proposed the two-
step flow of communication, positing  that the flow of information from media to the 
public is mediated by opinion leaders who tend to be more exposed to media messages 
and exert personal influence on opinions and attitudes of close others (Katz, & Lazarsfeld, 
1955). This model has been criticized for negating multiple steps of flows (Himelboim, 
Gleave, & Smith, 2009). Later, diffusion of innovations theory as suggested by Rogers in 
1962 complemented the simplified two-step flow model by addressing a series of steps in 
spreading information throughout society (Rogers, 1995). This theory considers that the 
introduction of innovation can come not only from opinion leaders who tend to position 
at the center of the social network but also from those who are located at the margins of 





attending to the context of communication and for emphasizing a linear adoption process 
(Rogers, 1976), although he amended this later.  
Recently, the two-step or multi-step flow model that assumes the presence of 
interpersonal influence on the information flow has been challenged by Bennett and 
Manheim (2006). Proposing a ‘one-step flow model,’ they argue that social and 
technological changes such as social isolation, personalized media consumption, and 
narrowcasting technologies allow people to receive messages directly from the media and 
reduce the role of opinion leaders. Covering Bennett and Manheim’s one-step flow model, 
Thorson and Wells (2012) suggest a more comprehensive framework to understand the 
contemporary dynamics of information flow. This framework is labeled ‘curated flows,’ 
which are composed of strategically, automatically, personally, and socially curated 
flows. Among the four flows, socially curated flow is most pertinent to the current study, 
which is defined as the information flow curated by one’s social network. Unlike Bennett 
and Manheim, Thorson and Wells argue that the one-step flow phenomenon is a part of 
information flow that takes place in strategic curation such as online political campaigns 
directed to certain individuals and that the two-step flow phenomenon still exists 
especially in social curation such as the information exchange among peers on SNSs. 
Moreover, they claim that social curation can play a role as a buffer against messages 
received through strategically curated flow by elites or media. However, they do not 
empirically demonstrate that the two-step flow of communication occurs in socially 





As argued by Thorson and Wells (2012), the two-step flow of communication 
might still have explanatory power for understanding the flow of information in online 
groups. The record of communication currently available on the Internet can help to test 
out this theory in an empirical setting of political discussions, even though interest in it 
faded in the past several decades since it lacked empirical support in regards to political 
affairs (Mutz & Young, 2011; Weimann, 1991). Recent studies related to the two-step 
flow of communication have focused on the diffusion of innovation and marketing 
research, whose context is likely to be different from the flows of information and 
influence in political communication (Gitlin, 1978). Not much has been explored in the 
context of politics other than examinations of characteristics and roles of opinion leaders 
in forming public opinions. How information flows in an empirical setting and how 
opinion leaders emerge from this flow of information still remain to be answered (Watts 
& Dodds, 2007). In this regard, the present study examines whether the two-step flow of 
communication model can be extended to online public fora.  
H1. The flow of information within an online political discussion group follows 
the two-step flow of communication. 
In addition, as pointed out by Weimann (1994), the distinction between flow of 
information and flow of influence is not clear in the literature. Based on empirical 
findings, Weimann (1991) explains that opinion leaders are different from influentials in 
that they are more widely distributed across social strata, more concentrated on a specific 





information as the network of who to whom news, consumer information, and gossip 
were distributed, and the flow of influence as the network of who to whom advice was 
sought, the flow of influence is found to take place through strong ties within a group, 
whereas the flow of information occurs through both strong and weak ties within and 
across groups (Weimann, 1983). These two seminal studies explore the difference 
between flow of information and flow of influence in terms of attributes and tie strength, 
but more needs to be done to understand the difference by investigating sub-structures of 
these flows. In this vein, major sub-structures that denote the existence of intermediary, 
transitivity, and hub/source are explored, which has been frequently addressed in 
previous studies on social and information networks (e.g. Robins, Snijders, Wang, 
Handcock, & Pattison, 2007; Shumate & Palazzolo, 2010; Weber & Monge, 2011). 
Detailed explanations about these sub-structures are provided in the Methodology chapter. 
RQ2. How is the flow of information different from the flow of influence within an 
online political discussion group? 
 
Opinion Leadership  
With interpersonal relations functioning as intervening variables to explain the 
effect of mass media on the public, the characteristics of opinion leaders have become 
newly important to understand this effect. They are neither apart from a group nor do 
they have conventional opinion leader traits as Rogers (1995) defined them; they emerge 





and can be found on every social, economic, or occupational level (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 
1955). The classic concept of opinion leadership has been further elaborated as being 
related “(1) to the personification of certain values (who one is); (2) to competence (what 
one knows); and (3) to strategic social location (whom one knows)” (Katz, 1957, p.73). 
In other words, opinion leaders tend to personify certain values, to have more familiarity 
with certain issues, and to be positioned at the center of certain social networks. Based on 
this conceptualization, previous studies have found that opinion leaders are more exposed 
to the mass media, are considered as experts in a specific field among others, join more 
various social activities and social organizations, and have higher level of interest in 
relevant issues and access to resources (for review, see Weimann, Tustin, van Vuuren, & 
Joubert (2007)).  
Considering that most of the research literature has examined opinion leadership 
situated in the mass media environment, these findings could be interpreted differently in 
the new media environment. In the new media environment, social relationships can be 
mediated through SNSs, and the public can not only consume information but also create 
content. Creating content such as producing images or video clips calls for higher levels 
of digital skills and cognitive efforts than simply importing content from elsewhere. 
Opinion leaders with more knowledge resources might be more engaged in producing 
content than those who are not opinion leaders.  
In addition, since opinion leaders are regarded as those positioned at the strategic 





remarks are likely to be worthy to gain attention. Huckfeldt (2001) found that people 
were able to perceive a group of people who are more politically knowledgeable and 
shared more discussions about politics with that group than others in one’s discussion 
network; in the present study, we call the group of people opinion leaders. This 
perception of and frequent discussion with opinion leaders might lead to the greater 
influence of messages written by opinion leaders. Although opinion leaders play a central 
role in the flow of information, it does not necessarily mean that their messages are more 
influential than others. If their messages are frequently passed along by others, which 
connotes the potential to shape the discussion, we can regard them as having social 
influence and label them as influentials.  
Taken together, hypotheses regarding opinion leaders could be as follows: 
H2-1. Opinion leaders are likely to create content more frequently than non-
opinion leaders. 
H2-2. Messages written by opinion leaders have greater social influence than 
those written by non-opinion leaders. 
 
Content of Discussion 
Exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints has been considered essential and critical 
to the work of democracy (Brundidge, 2010a; Gonzalez-Bailon, Kaltenbrunner, & 





society will be less tolerant of differences and be fragmented. However, selective 
exposure to similar viewpoints also appears to have other important - or even invaluable - 
outcomes. Based on survey results, Mutz (2006) found that people in cross-cutting 
discussion networks tend to participate less in politics. This finding is explained that 
people facing political disagreements are likely to end up with ambivalent viewpoints and 
feel social accountability for maintaining interpersonal harmony, which turns out to 
discourage political participation. The author concluded that homogeneous networks 
work better for political activities than heterogeneous networks. In this sense, exposure to 
heterogeneous viewpoints might be dysfunctional for political participation, contrary to 
Sunstein’s notion. This double-sidedness of the selective exposure phenomenon is also 
discussed in Stroud (2008), who found that selective exposure can hinder creating public 
policies that satisfy the general public while it also can motivate people to participate in 
politics.  
The prevalent use of SNSs seems to bring a more complicated picture of 
selective-exposure phenomenon to the fore (Mutz &Young, 2011): In one sense, SNSs 
can contribute to passive selective exposure by allowing people to be exposed to content 
highly personalized by their seemingly like-minded friends. However, in another sense, 
SNSs can increase exposure to dissimilar content by facilitating contact with a population 
larger than a circle of acquaintances. Unlike the previous studies that relied on survey 
respondents’ recollection or regarded contact with others as content to which people are 
exposed, the present study is able to investigate the relationship between sources and 





than simply lumping the two into perceived exposure to like-minded or cross-cutting 
content.  
In addition, the form of content itself, whether emotional or cognitive, is 
examined. Unlike the rational and deliberative discourse accentuated by Habermas 
(1989), the public sphere can be a “sensational place, one that attracts and engages 
spectators” (Marcus, 2002, p.148). As alluded to by several scholars (Bryce, 1888; 
Dahlgren, 2005; Dewey, 1927), expressive conversation, not only deliberative 
conversation, can be another mode of political discussion for conveying political 
messages and may be closer to the sort of  actual political talk in everyday life. Scholarly 
attention to emotion in political communication context was emphasized by Bennett and 
Iyengar (2008) who argue to realign theories with social change and decrease the gap 
between research and reality. 
Sharing this perspective, Cho et al. (2009) consider emotionality as well as 
rationality as a component of intrapersonal reflection in the process of ‘reasoning’ 
between the ‘stimuli’ of news use and the ‘response’ of democratic outcomes. Some 
studies address emotional expressions in relation to political participation and attention to 
the issue (e.g. Graham, 2010; Hoffman & Young, 2011; Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). 
However, emotional comments containing expressives such as anger and hostility are 
found to detract discussions from deliberation in Graham (2010). Although emotional 
reactions might harm deliberation, Hoffman and Young (2011) found that satire or 





compared to an online forum which regulated discussion topics and formats, an online 
forum which allowed more expressive latitude draws twice as many posts, despite a 
fewer number of both civic-related topics and participants. One might question how 
‘emotion-appealing, expressive conversation’ as a form of political conversation along 
with ‘rationalized, deliberative conversation,’ operate in actual settings. Does one 
dominate in certain fora? Do online political groups typically exhibit both types of 
conversation?  Since the literature has not developed criteria to clearly measure 
deliberation (Eveland et al., 2011), the present study re-frames the forms of content into 
emotional and cognitive.  
Overall, both sources and ideological perspectives of content are examined to find 
to what extent diverse content is incorporated into the discussion. In terms of the source, 
this study explores whether the discourse refers to the traditional media source, net-based 
media source, user-generated source, and so on. In terms of the ideological perspective, 
we examine whether the discourse is like-minded, ideologically heterogeneous, or non-
ideological. Forms of content are explored in order to investigate how far we might be 
from the ideal rational-critical discourse of Habermas, by comparing the proportions of 
emotional and cognitive remarks in online public fora.  
RQ3-1. What forms (emotional or cognitive) of discourse does the online political 






With respect to emotion, the effect of emotional components on information 
processing and furthermore on political consequences has been explored. Marcus and 
MacKuen (1993) found that enthusiasm increases continuous involvement in political 
campaigns, whereas anxiety enhances learning about politics. Valentino, Hutchings, 
Banks, and Davis (2008) found that anger reduces the quality or quantity of political 
information that people consumed by spending less time in searching information and in 
reading issue-specific articles, whereas anxiety leads to information seeking and learning 
about politics. Similar research results in regards to anxiety and anger are reported by 
MacKuen et al. (2010). They found that anxiety leads participants to search information 
challenging their opinions and be open to compromise, whereas aversion (including anger, 
disgust, contempt, and hatred) deters them to seek out opposing information and change 
their opinions, even after controlling for attitude strength, political interest, and news 
consumption of participants. The authors interpreted this result that anxiety and aversion 
have contrasting consequences for practicing citizenship, the former yielding deliberative 
citizenship and the latter partisan citizenship, and that selective exposure to congenial 
opinions is contingent upon emotional reactions (Marcus et al., 2011).  
Acknowledging the importance of emotional reaction to politics and its relation to 
the practice of citizenship, this study examines the virality and impact of emotional 
remarks in online political discussion which were found to reflect public opinions and 
voters’ political preferences (González-Bailón, Banchs, & Kaltenbrunner, 2012; 
O’Connor, Balasubramanya, Routledge, & Smith, 2010; Tumasjan, Sprenger, Sandner, & 





emotional content (Berger & Milkman, 2011; Dang-Xuan & Stieglitz, 2012; Huffaker, 
2010; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012). Among emotional content, anger and anxiety are 
significant predictors of sharing content (Berger & Milkman, 2011). Heath, Bell, and 
Sternberg (2001) found that disgusting stories are more likely to be passed along than 
emotionally positive stories. Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2012) also found that tweets with 
negative emotion have more retweets than those with positive emotion in the German 
Twitter-verse. Considering these previous findings, the present study hypothesizes that 
discourse with negative emotion tends to generate social influence more than those with 
positive emotion. In this study, the term social influence is used to conceptualize the 
behavior of passing along messages and its impact on discussions. 
H3-1. Discourse with negative emotion has stronger social influence than that 
with positive emotion. 
Furthermore, this study extends the previous research that usually has focused on 
the comparison between emotional and non-emotional content or between positive and 
negative emotions (Berger & Milkman, 2011; Dang-Xuan & Stieglitz, 2012; Pfitzner, 
Garas, & Schweitzer, 2012; Stieglitz & Dang-Xuan, 2012) by exploring the difference 
between emotional and cognitive forms of discourse. Emotion and cognition in political 
communication have been investigated in terms of how emotion influences cognitive 
processes, how cognitive processes influence emotion, (Valentino et al., 2008, Way & 
Master, 1996) and how emotion and cognition affect political consequences such as 





cognitive components are defined as education, knowledge, opinions, and beliefs 
(Conover & Feldman, 1986; Ragsdale, 1991). Different from this traditional 
operationalization of cognitive components, Huffaker (2010) examined cognition in an 
online environment and translated cognitive ability into linguistic diversity that shows an 
online message poster’s capability to use wide and complex vocabulary. The author also 
included linguistic assertiveness as a factor to address a message poster’s confidence and 
certainty in one’s thoughts, which has an effect on one’s credibility and social influence. 
Huffaker found that linguistic diversity and assertiveness are all significant in triggering 
feedback from others and have greater effect sizes than emotional words. In line with 
Huffaker’s approach, the present study considers cognition within the linguistic realm 
and examines the impact of the cognitive form of messages on distributing messages.  
H3-2. The cognitive form of discourse has stronger social influence than the 
emotional form. 
RQ3-2. Which cognitive form of discourse has greater social influence? 
 
Interaction with the Government 
Not only discussions within groups but also interactions with the government call 
for investigation. The public sphere is to have discussions, generate public opinions, and 
ultimately inform the state about these opinions by mediating civil society and the 
government (Habermas, 1989). In the recent years, many governments across the world 





with citizens through using new technologies such as SNSs, blogs, and home pages 
(Layne & Lee, 2001; Lampe, Larose, Steinfield, & Demaagd, 2011). This is part of an e-
government movement which seeks to enhance efficient interaction among government 
agencies, implement online service delivery, apply e-commerce to government 
transactions, and realize digital democracy (Jaeger & Thompson, 2004; Moon, 2002).  
These efforts are found to enhance the interaction between the government and 
citizens by providing relevant information, (Reddick, 2005), although many scholars 
claim that the real promise of transparency and citizen participation through e-
government efforts have not been realized. Wigand (2010, p.68) suggests four roles of 
Twitter for the government, including extending reachability, updating/sharing 
information, building relationships, and collaborating with stakeholders. In the case of 
certain Asian governments, Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube are found to contain web 
pages mostly for official government channels, i.e. information transmission (46%), 
followed by tourism/development (27%), education (11%), and others (16%) (Kuzma, 
2010)
4
.  Welch, Hinnant, and Moon (2005) found that U.S. citizens are generally satisfied 
with the information provision of government websites, but not with the two-way 
interaction. These phenomena indicate that the development of e-government projects has 
perhaps stagnated at the stage of “media interaction” rather than that of “human 
interaction” by simply employing the interactive nature of the technology itself without 
enhancing responsiveness of human agents (Stromer-Galley, 2000). 
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 Despite the lack of methodological rigor in this analysis, it can give an overview of Asian 





In the present study, communication between the government and the online 
group can be assessed by examining whether the group sends messages to the 
government and whether the government responds to them, in addition to discovering 
how much interaction the e-government outlet has with ordinary citizens. According to 
Chadwick (2003), e-government can blur the distinction between executive and 
legislative functions by allowing citizens to directly influence pre-legislative policy 
decisions of the government through online fora. Another viewpoint also suggests that e-
government might contribute to political polarization by offering one-sided perspectives 
to reinforce their power, rather than promoting the democratic process by empowering 
citizens with more information and tools to interact with the government (Jaeger, 2005). 
From the perspective of SNSs users (Valenzuela, Arriagada, & Scherman, 2012), using 
Facebook for news and for socialization is a significant predictor of joining protests, but 
Facebook users’ trust in the responsiveness of government officials to their protests does 
not accounted for their participation in protests. This implies that interaction with the 
government was not expected from people who use SNSs for political goals. These 
different perspectives can be discussed by exploring to what extent online discussion 
groups communicate with the government. 
RQ4. To what extent is the discussion group engaged in dialogue with the 







 Chapter 3:  Methodology 
To address research questions and hypotheses, the present study adopts both 
network analysis and content analysis approaches.  
Previous research which examined Internet use for political purpose has employed 
surveys, ethnographic approaches, content analyses, and panel studies. As listed in Table 
2, many studies have focused on the frequency of using the Internet for obtaining 
political information or messaging and the presence/absence of experiences facing cross-
cutting content. Content analyses on postings did not go further than describing the types 
of messages. More recently, network analysis has been applied to unveil the process of 
communication in online fora. While traditional methods are mostly based on 
respondents’ recollection or researchers’ observation and interpretation, network analysis 
can analyze interactions recorded on the Internet, which have been difficult to represent 
in other ways. Network analysis is an especially useful method to examine the broad 
diffusion of information in political communication settings where political discussion 
networks are found to be much larger than acquaintance networks (Eveland & Kleinman, 
2011), and it is uniquely capable of characterizing discussion networks in terms that are 








Method Study Internet-related variable 
Survey Brundidge (2010a), 
Halpern & Lee (2011), 
Kim (2011), Scheufele 
& Nisbet (2002), 
Stroud (2008), 
Wojcieszak & Mutz 
(2009), Yang (2003), 
Johnson et al. (2010) 
 Frequency of using online news/SNSs/online 
political messaging or chatting 
 Presence/absence of experiences being 
exposed to cross-cutting opinions online 
 Likert scale of agreeing/disagreeing with 
opinions encountered online 
 Likert scale of the reliance on SNSs 
Ethnography Mehra et al. (2004)  Interviews and observation on the Internet 
use of low-income families, sexual 





 Coding postings of Usenet newsgroups in 
terms of providing/seeking information, 
validating/replying to other messages, 
intensity of political affiliation, etc. 
 Coding postings of online discussion groups 
in terms of consumer activism/online 




Panel study Jennings & Zeitner 
(2003), Price (2009), 
Shah et al. (2005) 
 Frequency of seeking political information 
online/using Internet for politics/messaging 
on politics online 
 Difference between attendees and non-
attendees of online political discussions in 




Adamic & Glance 
(2005), Himelboim 
(2008, 2010) 
 Distribution, size, reciprocity of replying and 
being-replied-to networks of Usenet 
newsgroups 
 Sources of imported content 
 Number of URLs citing ideologically 
dissimilar blogs 
 
Table 2: Studies on the Internet Use for Political Purpose by Methodology 
 
Most of studies that conducted network analysis (Fisher et al., 2006; Himelboim, 





newsgroups and focused on the structure of discussions. Content of discussions has been 
rarely addressed, except introducing topics discussed in the posts. Seeing this gap in the 
literature, this study explores online communities based on SNSs, having more 
interaction and synchronous communication than Usenet newsgroups, and investigates 
the content of discussions as well as the structure of discussions. Specifically, network 
analysis is applied to configure the structure of the communication network among 
participants and the flow of information in the online political fora, and content analysis 
is used to understand the context of discussions. This combination of network analysis 
and content analysis helps to have system-level understanding without losing nuanced 
context embedded in the content (Gleave, Welser, Lento, & Smith, 2009).  
In sum, through a survey of methodologies of previous research, the current study 
employs both network analysis and content analysis. It selects online communities based 
on Twitter. Rationales for this selection are provided in the sections of ‘research setting’. 
The ‘methods’ section offers detailed explanation on network analysis and content 
analysis. Last, specific measures for each research question or hypothesis are illustrated 
in ‘analysis plan’ section.  
 
RESEARCH SETTING 
 For this investigation, online discussion groups are selected from Twitaddons.com 
which was launched in March 2010 from South Korea. Twitaddons.com, an add-on 





discussions in the Twitter-based environment (Choi, Park, & Park, 2012). Why 
Twitaddons.com and South Korea are chosen in this study will be explained in the 
following accounts.  
 On the basis of the Twitter platform, the group organizing feature of 
Twitaddons.com supports more long-standing and sustainable exchanges of ideas through 
community-based debate than does Usenet, where threads of discussions are created by 
unknown passers-by who post or reply to messages. Additionally, on Twitaddons.com, a 
whole network of an online group is retrievable. The whole network provides information 
which one is not able to gather from an ego network of an individual. Through a whole 
network approach, characteristics of the network structure and relationships between 
participants can be measured (Lewis, Kaufmana, Gonzaleza, Wimmerb, & Christakis, 
2008). Moreover, roles of individuals positioned in a certain nexus of the network can 
also be identified in the whole network (Hogan, 2008). The most commonly addressed 
disadvantage of the whole network approach is its arbitrary specification of the network 
boundary (Chen & Tan, 2009). However, in the present study, this objection can be 
overcome through analyzing online communities which have their own natural 
boundaries without any intervention from the researcher (Rogers & Kincaid, 1981).  
In the context of South Korea, well-known for its high broadband penetration and 
a series of public campaigns that were catalyzed within the cyberspace
5
 (Park & 
                                                             
5
 The examples of public campaigns catalyzed within the cyberspace are the candlelight protest of 





Jankowski, 2008), more than 10% of total population used Twitter as of November 5, 
2011 and still more people are joining Twitter at a rapidly increasing rate (Etnews, 2011). 
According to the online survey of Twitter users who were sampled from 15,000 panels by 
the Korea Information Society Development Institute (Lee et al., 2010), 70% of 
respondents used Twitter once or several times a day. On a daily basis, they sent out 3.7 
Tweet messages to others, retweeted 2.65 messages, and posted 2.22 Tweet messages on 
average. Among 61% of respondents who were following or being followed by 
celebrities, the top two reasons for having this connection were to get opinions or replies 
from celebrities and to garner information related to the celebrities, rather than to expand 
one’s social network. These responses as well as the frequent exchanges of Tweets 
suggest that Twitter has been regarded as the “hub of a real-time information network”
6
 
in South Korea (Lee et al., 2010, p.13).  
Moreover, the political current within Twitter has been demonstrated to be 
influential on political outcomes as exemplified in the recent by-election of the mayor of 
Seoul, the capital of South Korea (Dong & Jung, 2011). After this election, political 
parties even decided to hire social network experts to influence public perceptions on 
Twitter (Kwon & SongChae, 2011). The power of Twitter was also revealed in the 
general election of 2012 (Joo, 2012). Several studies have explored the political use of 
Twitter in Korea (Hsu & Park, 2012; Kim & Park, 2012; Park & Jankowski, 2008). 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
process of having a nationwide consensus and the election campaign of “Rohsamo,” an online-
based fan club of the former Korean president Roh Moo-hyun. 
6
 This phrase is translated into English from the original, “실시간 정보 네트워크의 중요한 





Surveys, voting results, and relevant studies illustrated above imply that Twitter has been 
culturally read as a viable sounding board for political discussions and collective activism 
in the Korean context.  
Based on these reasons, this research selects online groups from Twitaddons.com 
in South Korea. By inserting ‘politics’ as a search query in Twitaddons.com, the top five 
groups are selected based on the number of group members, and among these five, three 
groups were created by a political party or part-time laborers, rather than general publics, 
or had discussions irrelevant to politics. As a result, the two remaining groups that are 
based on grassroots activities are chosen for this study: ‘People’s Command’ and ‘Hope 
Republic’ as labeled by themselves (see Table 3). The former, organized in August 2010, 
is a communication platform of a civic group with the same name, led by an actor turned 
advocate who urges the consolidation of the opposition parties against the ruling party. 
This group frames the ruling party as representing conservative, vested interests, rather 
than representing the public or the socially disadvantaged. ‘Hope Republic’ was 
organized in December 2010 by a citizen who runs an institute of human networks and is 
composed of ordinary citizens who seek to discuss politics under the system of a virtual 
National Assembly by having several standing committees and a plenary session. This 
group has three political parties named as conservative, moderate, and liberal parties and 
implements a presidential election via direct messaging or a bulletin board designed for 





The activities of these groups garnered some media attention. In a book entitled 
the “Era of Mentors” (Kang, 2012), the author examines the intensification of the 
partisan-based conflicts through the activity of People’s Command. As well, Hope 
Republic was featured in the Korean Spirit (Cho, 2011), an online newspaper. In the 
interview with the Korean Spirit, the organizer of Hope Republic discussed how Hope 
Republic functions in the online environment, what kinds of social leaders are desirable 
in our society, and how the President should lead the state affairs. 
  People's Command Hope Republic 
Launch date 8/26/2010 12/3/2010 
No. of members 523 543 
No. of active members 
(Participants) 
96 147 
No. of Tweets 176 442 
No. of mentions 117 203 
 
Table 3: Online Groups for Political Discussions (3/1/2011-4/30/2011) 
 
Data, namely all tweets and their identifying information, were collected for the 
full two-month period from March 1 to April 30, 2011. This period is selected because it 
does not include any long-term national holidays or vacation seasons. All Tweets posted 
during this period are gathered, instead of focusing on Tweets generated by a specific 
person, topic, or event, since this study addresses online political discussions in daily life. 
Among the number of total members enrolled in these groups, members who tweeted 





or participants. As depicted in Figure 2, more than 30 messages are generated in some 
occasions, and typically three messages for People’s Command and to seven messages 
for Hope Republic are posted on average on a daily basis. 
In the graph of People’s Command, the spikes in early March and mid-April were 
the time when the meeting took place among activists in the progressive camp and when 
the group criticized the Election Commission for deterring the voting campaign of the 
group, respectively. In the graph of Hope Republic, the large number of Tweet messages 
was created at the end of April when the group had an election campaign to vote for the 
president of the group.  
 






For the analysis of the interaction between the online groups and the government, 
@bluehousekorea is selected among 138 government Twitter accounts identified in the 
directory of Korean Twitter. @bluehousekorea is the account of the Blue House 
(Cheong-wa-dae in Korean language), the official residence of the Korean President, and 
has the second largest number of followers next to the Korea Tourism Organization, 
which is not pertinent to this study. Considering that Korea follows the Presidential 
system and that political power is centralized to the President, communication between 
the President and the public is considered important, which adds more reasons to explore 
@bluehousekorea. Data show that 124 Tweet messages were gathered in total for the 
same period of time mentioned above. @bluehousekorea has 47 mentions and has 
connections with 25 Twitter accounts. 
 
METHODS 
Network analysis (Multi-level approach) 
The present study takes a multi-level approach by encompassing individual, dyad, 
and system levels of analysis. This investigation across levels is available in network 
analysis and allows one to fully explore the richness in the data (Monge & Contractor, 
2003). Although network analysis has its own limitation - namely the problem of 
generalizing research results with limited basis for statistical inference - it allows one to 
have a better understanding of the dynamics of discussion structure (Rogers & Kincaid, 





network analysis of offline political discussions. Moreover, among several methods to 
examine the flow of communication such as hierarchical position, reputation, self-
designation, and observation, social network position is regarded as more precise than 
others (Weimann et al., 2007). Notably, the role of an individual in the community, i.e. 
opinion leaders in this study, can be discovered through the network analysis, rather than 
being predetermined by the researcher (Garton, Haythornthwaite, & Wellman, 1997; 
Haythornthwaite, 2007). Since the role of individuals is not assigned but identified by 
network indices, network analysis can reduce arbitrariness or possible bias made by the 
researcher.  
Among various network analyses, social network analysis examines “a set of 
socially relevant nodes connected by one or more relations” (Marin & Wellman, 2011, 
p.11). According to Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, and Labianca (2009), social networks can be 
formed based on similarities, social relations, interactions, and flows. For instance, when 
two nodes (or actors in the network) have similar attributes, share kinship, communicate 
with each other, or exchange information, a connection can be made between the two 
nodes, and a network can be constructed with several connections among nodes. The 
present study examines a communication network which can be a part of social network 
composed of actors sharing conversations with each other.  
Networks of online discussion groups are constructed from mentions collected for 
each group. Mentions are directed to a person by containing @ sign in front of Twitter 





(Barash & Golder, 2010), this study uses the data of mentions to form the networks of 
communication among participants. For instance, in the following Tweet message, 
connections are made between message sender → target such as romeo0102→blu62, 
romeo0102→sangawon, romeo0102→UNIFYCOREA, and romeo0102→kim3moon1
7
. 
romeo0102 RT @blu62: @sangawon @UNIFYCOREA @romeo0102 
@kim3moon1 #ROKH [Hope Republic] Hi. I am going to run for election to the 
leader of the center party…
8
 
Note: Translation from Korean to English is provided by the author. The original is 
provided in the footnote. 
Source: Twitaddons.com 
 
This study defines the mention network as the information network, following previous 
studies (Conover et al., 2011; Yang & Counts, 2010) which examined the diffusion of 
information through the mention network of Twitter. The flow of information can be 
captured by mentioning among participants as exemplified below:  
blu62 @happygreen1 #ROKH Isn’t it difficult to find respectable companies and 
businessmen? I also looked for those to write for my book, but were not able to 
find one. Businessmen, especially entrepreneurs who run their own companies, 
should try harder to gain respect from our society. I think relevant issues should 
be raised and garner public attention.
9
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 Twitter IDs are disclosed, since these messages are open to the public without requiring a log-in 
account to read. 
8
 romeo0102 RT @blu62: @sangawon @UNIFYCOREA @romeo0102 @kim3moon1 
#ROKH [희망공화국]안녕하세요.보궐중인 중도당 대표일꾼에 출마합니다… 
9
 blu62    @happygreen1 #ROKH 존경할만한 기업,기업인 찾기 쉽지 않으시죠? 저도 
집필중인 책때문에 알아봤는데 눈에 띄질 않네요.우리나라 기업인,특히 오너기업인들의 





happygreen1 @blu62 #ROKH Maybe only Yuhan Corporation ㅠ.ㅜ* How 
miserable the business culture in our society is. Further check this company^^**
10
  
* This emoticon denotes tear-drops from eyes.  
** This emoticon denotes smiling eyes. 
Note: Translation from Korean to English is provided by the author. The original is 
provided in the footnote. 
Source: Twitaddons.com 
 
Mention networks are composed of active members who posted Tweets or who 
were mentioned by group members in online fora during the study period, irrespective of 
their exchange of mentions with others. Therefore, these networks include participants 
who only posted Tweets without exchanging mentions with other members. The number 
of nodes in mention networks is 96 for People’s Command and 147 for Hope Republic. 
 
Content analysis & co-word analysis 
Content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for the objective, 
systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” 
(Berelson, 1952/1971, p.18). Content analysis is ordinarily limited to analyzing manifest 
content (not latent responses), based on clearly stated rules and procedures which allow 
other researchers to replicate the study. All the content under review is assigned to one of 
the categories relevant to research questions or hypotheses. Through content analysis, 
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each category collects the numerical frequencies of the content item that has occurred or 
that is present in a conversation
11
. This method has been frequently applied to Web 
analysis (Herring, 2012). In the process of developing categories for coding, training 
coders, and checking inter-coder reliability after coding, this study follows guidelines 
suggested by Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken (2002) that cover selecting 
appropriate inter-coder reliability indices and implementing the coding procedure.  
In addition to the content coding, co-word analysis is conducted to configure 
clusters of discussions (Callon, Coutrial, & Laville, 1991). While content analysis 
quantifies the content by producing the frequency of words for each category defined by 
the researcher, co-word analysis is closer to a qualitative analysis by revealing 
relationships of words that appeared in the content (Biddix, Park, & Wang, 2009). This 
analysis measures the co-occurrence of words in the textual data, creates semantic 
associations, and maps clusters of discussions. 
 
ANALYSIS PLAN 
 Guided by the research schema below (see Table 4), specific measures for each 
research question or hypothesis are explained.  
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Structure RQ1. What is the structure of the discussion network that takes 




Degree of concentration, 
inclusiveness, equitability 
in mention network 
 
Gini coefficient, 
inclusiveness index,  
correlation between 





H1. The flow of information within an online political 
discussion group follows the two-step flow of communication. 
 
RQ2. How is the flow of information different from the flow of 
influence within an online political discussion group? 
 
Interaction between & 
within opinion/non-opinion 
leaders in mention network 
Sub-structures of mention 
and retweet networks 
Block modeling 






H2-1. Opinion leaders are likely to create content more 
frequently than non-opinion leaders. 
H2-2. Messages written by opinion leaders have greater social 
influence than those written by non-opinion leaders. 
IV: frequency of messages 
being retweeted, number of 
hyperlinked content created  






Discourse RQ3-1. What forms of discourse does the online political 
discussion group share, from which sources, and from which 
ideological perspectives? 
H3-1. Discourse with negative emotion has greater social 
influence than that with positive emotion. 
H3-2. The cognitive form of discourse has greater social 
influence than the emotional form. 
RQ3-2. Which cognitive form of discourse has greater social 
influence? 
 
Classification of content 
(source, ideology, form) & 
Clusters of discourses 
IV: emotional & cognitive 
variables  
DV: frequency of messages 
being retweeted 
Content analysis  








Interaction with the 
government 
 
RQ4. To what extent is the discussion group engaged in the 
dialogue with the government in online public fora? 
 
Interaction between 
@bluehousekorea & the 
groups/citizens 
Cross-mentioning 
Ego network of 
@bluehousekorea 





Structure of the discussion network (RQ1) 
The first research question of the discussion network structure (i.e. mention 
network structure) was explored by measuring the qualities of the whole network per se. 
In order to ascertain how concentrated, inclusive, and equitable the discussion network is, 
the gini coefficient, the inclusiveness index, and the equitability index were used to 
understand the network characteristics.  
The gini coefficient is a measure of concentration in the overall network: A value 
of zero means perfect equality and a value of one equals to perfect inequality. This index 
can indicate the extent to which discussions in the groups focus only around a few 
individuals. The more the mentions are evenly exchanged across participants, the lower 
the gini coefficient.  
Inclusiveness was calculated through dividing the number of participants who 
sent, received, or exchanged mentions at least once by the number of active participants 
who only posted tweets and did not participate in the discussion. The inclusiveness index 
can demonstrate how many group members join the discussion and how many members, 
who were clearly using Twitter at that time, are isolated from the discussion.  
Lastly, equitability was operationalized as the degree of correlation between the 
out-degree and in-degree distributions. Out-degree denotes sending out mentions to 
others and in-degree means receiving mentions from others. Sending more messages does 
not necessarily lead to receiving more messages, since each message is competing for the 





between the two is found to be statistically significant in a positive direction, it can be 
interpreted as equitable in the sense of receiving more attention or response by 
contributing more to the discussion (Himelboim, 2008). Kendall’s tau correlation 
coefficient was employed, because it is more robust in measuring the degree-degree 
association with a heavy-tailed degree distribution, compared to other correlation 
coefficients such as Pearson’s r and Spearman’s rho (Raschke, Schläpfer, & Nibali, 2010). 
 
Flows of information (H1) 
 For the investigation into the flows of information and influence, node-to-node 
relations were examined. According to Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955, p.33), “opinion 
leadership is not a trait which some people have and others do not,” but rather, it is “an 
integral part of the give-and-take of everyday personal relationships.” In other words, 
opinion leadership is a social construct based on relations, rather than demographics or 
attributes of a certain type of people.  
The analysis of the network built from the interpersonal exchange of mentions 
configures the flows of information, which might or might not result in finding opinion 
leaders. Opinion leaders can be identified in the case when a group of participants are 
positioned in the nexus of information flow and dominate a remarkably large share of 
discussions. Their existence can be visualized in the discussion network as well as 
evidenced by the indices of degree centrality and flow betweenness of each participant. 





attributable to each of them. Flow betweenness
12
 demonstrates the “amount of flow in the 
network that would not occur if the node were not present (or were choosing not to 
transmit)” (Borgatti & Everett, 2006, p.474). Participants with high flow betweenness are 
those in the position to facilitate the flow of information in the network. In this research, 
opinion leaders were defined as those who have high share of both degree and flow 
betweenness centralities. This operationalization is supported by Lee and Cotte (2009) 
and Mullen, Johnson, and Salas (1991) who found positive correlation between opinion 
leadership and network centrality indices. 
The hypothesis that the flow of information within online discussion groups 
corresponds to the two-step flow of communication was tested with block model analysis. 
Block modeling is a useful measure to account for role relationships such as giving or 
receiving information (Garton et al., 1997). It generates block density, which is the 
proportion of existing connections against all possible connections (Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005). After identifying opinion leaders among participants, the relationship between 
opinion-leader block and non-opinion-leader block can be represented as Figure 3: (a) 
and (d) indicate communication within each block (intra-block density); (b) means the 
conversation initiated by opinion leaders towards non-opinion leaders (inter-block 
density), and (c) vice versa (inter-block density). If the two-step flow of communication 
exists in online group discussions, the size of block density would increase in the 
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 This study adopted flow betweenness centrality, instead of the widely-used betweenness 
centrality. The latter is generated by binarizing the data into presence or absence of a connection, 
while the former fully utilizes information from the valued data. Since the current study has a 
valued data and attempts to explore the flow of information, flow betweenness centrality is a 





ascending order of (d), (b), and (c). This implies that non-opinion leaders, i.e. general 
participants, communicate more frequently with opinion leaders than they communicate 
with other non-opinion leaders, and refer to opinion leaders more frequently than opinion 
leaders refer to them. The network data were dichotomized into zero (when a tie is absent) 
and one (when a tie is present) for this analysis.  
 
 
Figure 3: Block Modeling of the Two-Step Flow of Communication 
 
Comparison between flows of information and influence (RQ2) 
The network of retweets was formed as a proxy for the flow of influence. 
Retweeting is rebroadcasting others’ Tweets with attribution for the purpose of spreading 
the messages to one’s followers (Barash & Golder, 2010). Social implications of 
retweeting have been highlighted in previous studies, concluding that the act of 
retweeting demonstrates public agreement with someone and validation of others’ 
opinions (boyd, Golder, & Lotan, 2010; Parmelee & Bichard, 2011); this indirectly 
represents the credibility and reputation of the person retweeted (Recuero et al., 2011). 





paradoxically retweet messages with which one does not agree. This use of retweeting 
was filtered by reading the message retweeted, i.e., by considering the context.  
The network was formed between the person who retweeted a message and the 
author who originally created the message.
13
 For instance, in the following Tweet 
message, a retweet network was formed between the retweeter → the retweeted (i.e. the 
original author) such as HummyMom → blu62, togater → blu62, and yhsgmo → blu62.
14
 
The message below was retweeted several times. Once a message of blu62 is retweeted, it 
is distributed to the followers of the retweeter. In this sense, the act of retweeting shows 
the public endorsement of blu62’s opinion, which connotes the flow of influence between 
blu62 and those who retweeted blu62’s message. 
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 It was empirically confirmed that people usually cite original sources in retweeting (Cha et al., 
2010). 
14
 The retweet network did not include the tie of HummyMom-togater, HummyMom-yhsgmo, or 
togater-yhsgmo. Some may speculate that togater or yhsgmo might have played a role to revive 
millionocracy’s Tweet message and HummyMom might be affected by either togater or yhsgmo. 
However, considering that this is not a widely opened Twitter space but a community where 
participants are well exposed to each other’s remarks, the role of intermediaries might not have as 
much impact as they might have in the general Twitter environment where Tweets rise and 
disappear fast in the flood of messages. Moreover, Oh and Nguyen (2010) pointed out problems 
of including intermediaries in building retweet networks and proposed to consider relationships 
only between the user who retweets a message and the author of that message in order to measure 
influence with retweet networks. This approach has been made in several studies that examined 
retweet activities in Twitter (e.g. Conover et al., 2011; Tinati, Carr, Hall, & Bentwood, 2012; Van 





HummyMom   RT @togater: RT @yhsgmo: RT @blu62: Whether or not the 
candidate Um Kiyoung was aware of the illegal election campaign, he should take 
the responsibility for violating the rule.
15
   
Note: Translation from Korean to English is provided by the author. The original is 
provided in the footnote.  
Source: Twitaddons.com 
Not only does the act of retweeting a message several times indicate the flow of 
influence from the retweeted to the retweeter, but also the comments added to the 
retweeted message clearly show the public validation of the message, for instance the 
phrase “I do agree with this idea” in the following message. 
sigolsonye I do agree with this idea,, so what is the response from Japan? RT 
@rockminater: It seems to be very desirable to establish an ocean research station 




Note: Translation from Korean to English is provided by the author. The original is 
provided in the footnote.  
Source: Twitaddons.com 
The number of nodes in retweet networks was 96 for People’s Command and 147 
for Hope Republic (including participants who were not engaged in retweet activities), 
which is the same as the number of nodes in mention networks. Given that all retweets 
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 HummyMom    RT @togater: RT @yhsgmo: RT @blu62: 엄기영후보 사전인지여부와 
상관없이 책임지는 모습 필요해 보이는군요.  
16
 sigolsonye 이거 저두 좋다고 생각합니다,, 그래서일본이 뭐라고 한다지요? . RT 
@rockminater: #ROKH 독도에 해양과학기지 건설을 추진하는것은 매우 바람직한 일인것 






included mentions, though not all mentions included retweets, it is possible that the 
mention network and retweet network were correlated to each other. However, 
considering that the way of forming the former is different from the latter, and the 
intention of mentioning is distinguishable from that of retweeting, the two networks 
might generate different structural qualities. 
 The comparison between the information network (i.e. mention network) and the 
influence network (i.e. retweet network) was made by investigating the sub-structures of 
the two networks. For this analysis, exponential random graph (ERG) models, so called 
p* models, were employed. The ERG method allows for placing an observed network 
within a probability distribution of graphs, and tests whether a particular sub-graph in the 
observed network occurs more or less than expected by chance alone (Robins, Pattison, 
Kalish, & Lusher, 2007). Since network analysis is based on the relation between nodes, 
ordinary statistical analysis that assumes independence among observations is not 
applicable. However, the ERG method considers the dependence between ties, which 
better fits the characteristic of social relationships (Lusher & Ackland, 2011). This 
method was implemented by using PNet (Wang, Robins, & Pattison, 2005) which is 
based on the Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) maximum likelihood estimation. A 
parameter in the model is regarded as significant if the absolute value of the parameter 
estimate is more than twice its standard error (i.e. p < .05) (Shumate & Palazzolo, 2010). 
By comparing the two networks to random networks, the structural qualities of 





understand the difference between the flow of information and the flow of influence in 
online political discussions. Among several sub-structures in PNet, star, alternative 
triangle, alternative 2-path, and sink/source parameters were selected, guided by relevant 
studies on information and communication networks (e.g. Lee & Lee, 2012; Uddin, 
Hamra, & Hossain, 2011; Weber & Monge, 2011) (see Figure 4).  
Star parameters including 2-star, 3-star, and alternative star parameters are related 
to the tendency of centralization in the network: The large number of star parameters in 
the network implies that the network is centralized on a few actors.  
Triangle parameters indicate how much transitivity is embedded in the network. 
Transitivity here means that if A is a friend of B and B is a friend of C, A and C tend to 
become friends to reduce psychological strain and maintain the stability of relationship 
among the three people (Monge & Contractor, 2003). As a result, the more the alternative 
triangles in the network, the more cliquelike the network tends to be (Snijders, Pattison, 
Robins, & Handcock, 2006). The alternative 2-path parameter indicates that multiple 
paths exist between two actors, which implies the presence of intermediaries and the pre-
condition of transitive relationships.  
The sink/source parameter denotes actors who only have in-links/out-links, which 
means those who only receive/send mentions or retweets without having any reciprocal 
ties with others (Weber & Monge, 2011). As depicted in Figure 4, there is no outgoing tie 





These parameters included in the ERG models of the present study need to be 
interpreted together, since they are interdependent within the model (Lusher & Ackland, 
2011).  
 
Figure 4: PNet Parameters Included in the Model 
Note: The above graphs are adapted from Wang, Robins, & Pattison (2009). In ERG models, arc 
and reciprocity parameters are included as basic parameters, but the present study only contains 
the latter. The number of arcs was fixed in conducting model estimation, a method frequently 
used for large networks that have more than 40 nodes, as in the present study; otherwise, it is 
unlikely that convergence can be achieved between the estimated model and the observed 
network (Snijders et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2009). 
 
The ERG models of this study did not include the arc parameter because the 
number of arcs was fixed in conducting model estimation. This method is frequently used 
for large networks that have more than 40 nodes
17
 as in the current case; otherwise it is 
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not possible to achieve convergence between the estimated model and the observed 
network (Snijders et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2009). In this regards, the model estimation in 
the present study was conducted by fixing the number of arcs into that which each 
network possesses. The convergence of the parameter estimation can be checked with a 
convergence t-ratio: If the t-ratios of all parameter estimates are less than 0.1 in absolute 
value, it indicates a good convergence (Robins et al., 2007). After achieving convergence, 
the goodness-of-fit (GOF) of the model should be tested to assess how well the model 
explains the properties of the observed network and whether it produces the features of 
the observed network that were not modeled. The model had a good fit if t-ratios of the 
parameters included in the model are less than 0.1 and those of the other parameters are 
less than 2 in absolute value. The network data was dichotomized in the whole process of 
ERG modeling.  
 
Characteristics of opinion leaders (H2-1 & H2-2) 
Characteristics of opinion leaders were examined based on the extent of content-
creating activities and the frequency of their messages being distributed by others.  
Content-creating activities were measured by investigating Tweet messages, 
authored by the message sender, that contain hyperlinks. Hyperlinks lead the readers to 
webpages that have further information such as news articles, photos, and video clips. 
Whether this hyperlinked content was produced by participants of People’s Command 





hyperlinks embedded in the Tweet messages. In addition, the frequency of messages 
distributed by others was operationalized into the frequency of messages being retweeted. 
The more frequently the message is retweeted, the greater influence it is regarded to have 
on shaping the discussion.  
 To test the current hypotheses, binary logistic regression analysis was conducted 
by defining the number of hyperlinks and the frequency of messages retweeted as 
independent variables and opinion leader / non-opinion leader status as a dependent 
variable. The number of Tweets posted by each participant in the group discussion was 
inserted as a control variable. These variables were not subject to a multi-collinearity 
problem, having variance inflation factors
18
 (known as VIF) all less than 2.2.  
 
Diversity of discourse (RQ3-1) 
The third research question interrogates the forms, sources, and ideological 
perspectives of discourse shared among participants in online public fora. The analysis on 
the forms of discourse was conducted with ‘Korean Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count’ 
(K-LIWC) software freely available at http://k-liwc.ajou.ac.kr/. This is the Korean text 
analysis program developed by Lee, Sim, and Yoon (2005), based on Pennebaker, 
Francis, and Booth’s (2001) English ‘Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count’ (LIWC). K-
LIWC analyzes words in terms of the emotional dimension and categorizes them into 
positive and negative categories. The positive category includes positive sentiment (e.g. 
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 VIF is an index that detects collinearity among independent variables. If VIF exceeds 10, it 





hope, support, contribute, invaluable), positive emotionality (e.g. good, happy, glad, 
easy), and optimistic/energetic (e.g. enthusiastic, diligent, exciting) variables, and the 
negative category has negative sentiment (e.g. problematic, aloof, disastrous, damaged), 
anxiety (e.g. anxious, pressuring, careful), anger (e.g. rageful, contemptuous), and 
sadness/depression (e.g. lost, sad, gloomy) variables. The cognitive dimension contains 
causation (e.g. causing, resulting from, fundamental), reflection (reconsidering, learning, 
wise, self-reflecting), expectation (e.g. possible, again, expecting), limitation (e.g. 
oblivious, restricting, being unaware of), speculation (e.g. almost, what, rough, guessing), 
and conviction (e.g. required, urgent, arguing, legitimate) variables. Multiple-coding is 
allowed in K-LIWC, since a single word can convey, for instance, positive sentiment and 
optimism at the same time. K-LIWC generates the number of words classified into each 
variable. For this analysis, 618 Tweet messages are manually entered one by one in K-
LIWC software. 
Sources of content, which indicate the origin of hyperlinks embedded in Tweet 
messages, were classified into user-generated content, traditional media, net-based 
media,
19
 government, civic groups, and others, adapted from the classification by 
Himelboim (2010) (see Appendix 1). User-generated content is sub-divided into video 
clips, images, and SNS texts. This analysis was assisted with ‘Webometric analyst web 
analysis software.’
20
 This software allows for organizing numerous URLs to the domain 
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 Net-based media in the present analysis indicate online journalism that does not simply 
aggregate content from traditional media sources but creates its own editorial agenda and news 
reports. In the present study, amn.kr and ohmynews.com are classified as net-based media. 
20





level such as .com and .net. For instance, a URL 
‘http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/opinion/sunday/the-oscars-as-looking-
glass.html?_r=1&ref=opinion’ is transformed into a domain ‘nytimes.com.’  
For ideological diversity, Freelon (2010) suggests three models of online 
democratic communication — deliberative, communitarian, and liberal individualist 
models — and indicative metrics to identify these models in online political discourse. 
Among these metrics, inter-ideological (deliberative), intra-ideological (communitarian), 
and non-ideological/personal (liberal individualist) questioning and responses were 
selected, which allows exclusive categorization of the ideological perspectives embedded 
in Tweet messages. In the context of the contemporary political culture in South Korea, 
conglomerates and major mass media outlets
21
 as well as the incumbent government are 
regarded as representing vested interests of the conservative camp (Chang, 2008). 
Considering that online communities in the present study criticized this conservative 
hegemony as denoted in their discussions, they can be broadly classified as having a 
liberal perspective. In this regard, Tweet messages which reflected conservative or 
moderate ideology were included in inter-ideological category and messages which are 
aligned to liberal ideology were in intra-ideological category. Messages which did not 
contain any ideological perspective or did mention facts and personal issues were coded 
into the non-ideological or personal category.  
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 Major mass media outlets that have been regarded as representing conservative camp in the 






Details of the coding scheme for the manual content analysis on sources and 
ideological perspectives are provided in Appendix 1. The level of measurement is a 
website domain for sources of content and a Tweet message for ideological perspectives. 
Each Tweet message can be composed of several sentences or several words. Based on 
the coding scheme, two coders including the researcher conducted the coding, and the 
inter-coder reliability was tested on a subsample of 60 Tweet messages randomly selected. 
The inter-coder reliability was measured using Scott’s pi (1955) which is well-known as 
a conservative index (Lombard et al., 2002) and has been widely used in communication 
studies (e.g. Himelboim, 2010; Matthes & Kohring, 2008; Meyers, Brashers, & Hanner, 
2000) to measure nominal variables with two coders. Scott’s pi was calculated by using 
ReCal2 developed by Freelon (2005). In the present study, it was .85 for sources of 
content and .82 for ideological perspectives of content, all achieving an acceptable level
22
 
(Lombard et al., 2002). Coding conducted by the second coder, who was not the 
researcher, was used for the analysis. 
 For co-word analysis, KrKwic (Korean Key Words In Context) (Park & 
Leydesdorff, 2004) was used to analyze the occurrence frequency of words and the 
connections between these words. Based on this relationship of words, which was 
generated as a [word x word] matrix, CONCOR (CONvergence of iterated CORrelations) 
analysis was conducted with UCINET 6.0. This procedure runs numerous correlations 
between nodes and partitions these nodes into blocks with similar structural equivalence 
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 The acceptable level of inter-coder reliability coefficient is .80 in most cases and sometimes .70 





(Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). Through CONCOR, clusters of words correlated to each 
other were created. The present study employed words that appeared more than five times 
in the discourse for co-word analysis to increase the readability of the graph.  
 
Emotional and cognitive forms of discourse (H3 & RQ3-2) 
 The social influence of emotional and cognitive content was examined based on 
the coding of the forms of discourse described above. The social influence of discourse 
was operationalized into the retweetability of a message: The more frequently the 
message is passed along, the greater social influence the message has. Thus, the 
dependent variable is the frequency of being retweeted per message. Given that the 
dependent variable is count data and has an over-dispersion problem,
23
 negative binomial 
regression analysis was conducted to examine the effects of emotional and cognitive 
variables on the frequency of messages retweeted. The group variable was included in the 
regression model in order to control the difference between People’s Command and Hope 
Republic. These variables did not exhibit multicollinearity, having VIFs all around 1 and 
2. Nagelkerke’s R
2
, a modified version of the widely used Cox and Snell’s R
2
, was 
calculated as a proxy of R
2 
in ordinary least squares regression analysis.  
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 The standard deviation of the dependent variable (1.576) was greater than the mean (0.71). The 





Interaction with the e-government outlet (RQ3-2) 
To ascertain how often the online group for political discussion interacts with the 
government, the frequency of cross-mentioning between @bluehousekorea and the two 
online groups was explored. The frequency of cross-mentioning indicates how often 
@bluehousekorea appeared in the discussions of online groups and how often group 
members’ accounts showed up on the Twitter page of @bluehousekorea. Additionally, 
the ego network of @bluehousekorea was visualized based on mentions exchanged in 
order to see with whom @bluehousekorea had conversation, and the content of 
conversation was also visualized in terms of the occurrence frequency of words appeared 
in Tweet messages.  
Overall, network analysis was conducted by using UCINET 6.0 (Borgatti, Everett, 
& Freeman, 1999) and the networks were visualized by either NetDraw in UCINET 6.0 
or NodeXL (Smith, Milic-Frayling, Shneiderman, Rodrigues, Leskovec, & Dunne, 2010). 











Chapter 4:  Research Results 
NETWORK ASPECTS (FLOW OF INFORMATION) 
Concentration, inclusiveness, and equitability of the discussion network (RQ1) 
The structure of the discussion network was measured with the gini coefficient, 
inclusiveness index, and equitability index (see Table 5). The gini coefficient of both 
People’s Command and Hope Republic was close to one, which indicates high inequality. 
This result implies that discussions were not joined by many people, but were led by just 
a few individuals. In terms of inclusiveness, more than 85% of both group members who 
posted Tweet messages during the study period participated in discussions with others. 
This result also implies that less than 15% were isolated from the discussion. In addition, 
the Kendall’s Tau correlation between out-degree and in-degree was not statistically 
significant in both groups, but the negative sign of their correlation coefficients indicate 
that people who contributed more to the discussion were not likely to get more attention 
by receiving mentions from others. Overall, the discussion networks of the two groups 
tended to be centralized and inclusive without having conclusive indication of 
equitability. 
 
Table 5: Characteristics of Discussion Network Structures 
People's command Hope republic
Gini coefficient .990 .993
Inclusiveness .875 .864
Equitability -.031 -.056





Presence of the two-step flow of communication (H1) 
As defined in the present study, five opinion leaders were identified by rank-
ordering all participants in terms of degree and flow betweenness centralities. We did not 
arbitrarily decide the top five to be opinion leaders, but it turned out to be five people 
who consistently ranked top five in both degree and flow betweenness centralities (see 
Appendix 2). The network positions of those top five in both centrality measures are 
visualized in Figure 5. In both groups, the five opinion leaders accounted for over 40% of 
degree centrality and over 70% of flow betweenness centrality, which implies their strong 











Figure 5: Opinion Leadership in terms of Degree and Flow Betweenness Centralities 
Note: Degrees were symmetrized into maximum values. Diagonals and isolates were removed 
from the graphs.  
 
The block model of opinion leaders and everyone else, i.e., non-opinion leaders, 
shows that non-opinion leaders had the lowest probability of exchanging information 
with one another (.004 for People’s Command, .003 for Hope Republic), but had a higher 
inclination to communicate with opinion leaders (i.e. sending mentions to and receiving 
mentions from opinion leaders) (see Figure 6). Non-opinion leaders had a stronger 
tendency to talk to opinion leaders (i.e. sending mentions to opinion leaders) (.310 for 





from opinion leaders) (.040 for People’s Command, .094 for Hope Republic). These 
differences in block densities were statistically significant, and the overall model 
accounted for over 10% of the variance in the mention network, thus providing support 
for H1.  
 
 
Figure 6: Block Model of the Two-Step Flow of Communication in terms of Block 
Density 
Note: (  ) is the unstandardized coefficient of a regression model with the [non-opinion leaders x 
non-opinion leaders] block as the reference category. 
 
The alternative explanation of this result might be the preferential attachment 





rich-get-richer phenomenon, which explains that the high [opinion leaders x opinion 
leaders] block density and [non-opinion leaders x opinion leaders] block density resulted 
from the high visibility of opinion leaders who drew more attention than others in the 
discussion network. While the preferential attachment mechanism provides a good 
explanation of the emergence of high-degree nodes in the network, it fails to explain why 
the [opinion leaders x non-opinion leaders] block had greater density than the [non-
opinion leaders x non-opinion leaders] block: If the relationship between opinion leaders 
and non-opinion leaders was governed by preferential attachment, the [opinion leaders x 
non-opinion leaders] block should have had the lowest block density, which was not seen 
as such in the present analysis.  
In this regard, this study reached the conclusion that the two-step flow of 
communication took place in online discussions of both People’s Command and Hope 
Republic, having opinion leaders who mediate the information-abundant environment. 
 
Difference between the flow of information and the flow of influence (RQ2) 
The sub-structures of information and influence networks, i.e. the mention and 
retweet networks, were examined through the ERG modeling (see Table 6). The models 
of both mention and retweet networks had a good fit, having t-ratios of model parameters 
below 0.1, and those of other parameters all fall below two in absolute value (see 
Appendix 3). In both mention and retweet networks of People’s Command and Hope 





triadic structure did not appear more frequently than chance predicts. Considering the 
positive signs of the estimates, there was a weak, though non-significant, tendency to 
form connections between the two who share mutual friends. We can interpret this as 
saying that both the mention and retweet networks were not significantly cliquish, and 
participants who played a role as intermediaries were not significantly present, compared 
to random networks. The other commonality of the two networks was the countervailing 
directionality between the 2-out-star and higher-order out-star parameters: The sign of the 
2-out-star parameter was positive, whereas those of the 3-out-star or AoutS were negative, 
which means that the observed networks had 2-out-star more and 3-out-star/AoutS less 
than predicted by a random distribution. These results indicate that people mentioned or 
retweeted others, but only a few rather than many.  
Setting aside this common tendency, a greater number of in-star parameters (2-in-
star, AinS) were significant more than in the mention network than in the retweet 
network for both People’s Command and Hope Republic. Mention network had a higher 
tendency of centralization than expected for random networks. Centralization can result 
from degree effects and triangulation effects: Degree effects take place when a few, 
popular nodes attract the larger number of degrees, and triangulation effects occur when a 
core in the network is composed from overlapping triadic relations (Robins et al., 2007). 
Considering that triadic parameters (AT-T, A2P-T) were not significant and in-star 
parameters (2-in-star, AinS) were, the centralization tendency in mention network is 
explained by degree effects, i.e., having a few participants who were frequently 





the mention network, whereas they were not significant in the retweet network. The 
mention network had a larger number of sinks than expected by chance. This means that 
some individuals did not maintain reciprocal relationships with others, by only receiving 
mentions and not replying them back. Sources that do not receive any feedback but send 
out mentions were less likely to exist in the mention network than would be predicted by 










Table 6: Results of PNet Estimation 
Note: Since the number of arcs was fixed in conducting PNet estimation, the ERG models of this 
study do not include the arc parameter. Detailed explanation for this procedure is provided in 








reciprocity 2.17 (.63) * -.05 -.12 (1.42) -.01
2-in-star .10 (.02) * .06 .22 (.08) * .03
2-out-star 1.24 (.58) * -.01 8.34 (1.42) * -.01
3-in-star .00 (.00) .06 -.01 (.01) .04
3-out-star -.13 (.10) .02 -2.36 (.62) * -.01
sink 4.57 (.91) * .01 -1.20 (1.30) -.04
source -3.03 (.93) * .05 2.34 (1.26) -.01
AinS 2.86 (.50) * .03 .83 (.72) .00
AoutS -3.57 (1.24) * -.03 -8.72 (1.51) * -.01
AT-T .20 (.11) .07 .40 (.32) .02








reciprocity 2.24 (.39) * -.06 1.76 (.62) * .01
2-in-star .18 (.04) * .02 .14 (.08) -.01
2-out-star .98 (.18) * .01 2.12 (.74) * .07
3-in-star -.01 (.00) * .03 -.01 (.00) -.01
3-out-star -.08 (.02) * .02 -.34 (.13) * .10
sink 2.43 (.64) * -.02 .57 (.99) -.03
source -.31 (.62) -.03 1.06 (1.03) .01
AinS 1.39 (.40) * -.03 1.56 (.66) * .04
AoutS -2.00 (.66) * .00 -2.14 (1.59) .03
AT-T .10 (.12) -.06 .03 (.20) .04
A2P-T .00 (.02) .00 .08 (.04) .03











Although the direct comparison between mention and retweet networks was not 
available in the current analysis, the difference in structural properties of the two 
networks compared to those of random networks allowed this study to extrapolate as 
follows: The flows of information and influence were less likely to be transitive and 
mediated. Only a few participants were referred to and retweeted by others. The flow of 
information had star-based, centralized connections which were more salient than those 
in the flow of influence. The significant presence of sinks in the mention network could 
be another indication of centralization. These findings were also supported by the 
network centralization index of the overall graph level: The in-degree mention network 
(45.0% for People’s Command, 23.9% for Hope Republic) had lower network 
centralization than the in-degree retweet network (25.6% for People’s Command, 18.8% 
for Hope Republic).  
 
Opinion leaders as the influentials (H2) 
 As descriptive statistics in Table 7 show, opinion leaders compared to non-
opinion leaders created a larger number of hyperlinks, had a higher frequency of their 
messages being retweeted, and had a greater number of Tweets on average, although the 
standard deviation of each variable was large. These differences between opinion leaders 








Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of the Characteristics of Opinion Leaders and Non-opinion 
Leaders 
 
The result suggests that those whose messages were frequently retweeted were 
highly likely to be opinion leaders (see Table 8). However, the number of hyperlinks was 
not a significant factor distinguishing between opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders, 
although the positive sign of the coefficient implies that the former tended to create 
content more than the latter. These results were produced after controlling the number of 
messages posted in the group, which showed that opinion leaders posted a greater number 
of Tweets than those who were not opinion leaders. The regression model was 




Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Number of hyperlinks 2.80 (4.962) .12 (.980)
Frequency of messages being retweeted 25.20 (18.570) .38 (1.425)
Number of Tweets posted in the group 18.10 (15.103) 1.88 (3.396)






Table 8: Results of Binary Logistic Regression Predicting Opinion Leadership 
Note: This analysis includes both People’s Command (N=96) and Hope Republic (N=147). 
 
Overall, although opinion leaders are assumed to have better digital skills to 
create content, the content creation factor was not significant enough to discern opinion 
leaders from non-opinion leaders, thus rejecting H2-1. Considering the ERG results that 
the retweet network was not centralized as much as was the mention network, not only 
opinion leaders’ but also several others’ messages might have been retweeted. However, 
the frequency of messages being retweeted demonstrated that it was mostly the opinion 
leaders’ messages that were forwarded, providing support for H2-2.  
 
Predictor Coefficient              (SE)
Number of hyperlinks .083 (.228)
Frequency of messages being retweeted .421 (.132) **
Number of Tweets posted in the group .155 (.060) *
(Constant) -6.185 (1.230) ***
Model χ2
N
* p  < .05   ** p  < .01   *** p  <.001







Sources, ideological perspectives, and forms of discourse (RQ3-1) 
 In terms of the sources of hyperlinked content, half were user-generated content 
in both People’s Command and Hope Republic (see Table 9).
24
 Most of the user-
generated content was images such as participants’ photos and slogans and text messages 
containing parody and satire written by like-minded fellow citizens. The information 
from the government was not cited at all by both groups. In addition, information from 
either traditional or net-based media was rarely shared. These clear tendencies show that 
participants of online political discussion were interested in what fellow citizens think 
about, instead of sharing what the government or the media creates.  
 As for the ideological perspectives, only 10% of messages were inter- or intra-
ideological. This result could be an under-estimation of the reality, since messages that 
explicitly denote ideological perspectives were only coded as inter- or intra-ideological. 
Among ideologically opinionated messages, those with intra-ideological perspective were 
present more frequently than those with inter-ideological perspective. Many other 
messages contained opinions that were not overtly ideological, laments, facts, and 
personal issues. For instance, messages such as “Is there any public officer who really 
serves public interest nowadays?” and “Japanese government seems to suffer from 
incompetence as seen in their attempt to cover up the damage from the explosion of 
                                                             
24
 The other half were mostly in the civic groups and others category. Especially considering that 
People’s Command is a communication platform of a civic group, it is inevitable that the 





nuclear power plants. Japan is our neighbor country, but I don’t like what they are doing 
now.” contained political opinions, but coded as non-ideological.  
In regards to the form of discourse, emotional words outnumbered cognitive 
words in both groups. However, the prevailing valence of emotion was contrary to each 
other; discourses in People’s Command were more negative and those in Hope Republic 
were more positive. Among negative emotion, anger was more frequently expressed than 
anxiety in both groups.  
For cognitive components, the two groups did not show much difference: 
Conviction had the highest frequency, and causation the lowest. This result implies that 
discussions made in the two groups were not analytical, such as exploring causes of 











Table 9: Content Analyses by Source, Ideology, and Form 
Note: Content analysis of forms was conducted with K-LIWC which allows multiple coding. ‘Others’ 
category of the sources of hyperlinked content included web portals, online encyclopedia, and broken 
hyperlinks.
Frequency (Ratio) Frequency (Ratio) Frequency (Ratio)
Source User-generated content 37 (49%) 24 (52%) 61                (50%)
     Video clips 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 2                  (2%)
     Images 12 (16%) 17 (37%) 29                 (24%)
     Text 23 (31%) 7 (15%) 30                 (25%)
Traditional media 0 (0%) 8 (17%) 8                  (7%)
Net-based media 2 (3%) 0 (0%) 2                  (2%)
Government 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Civic groups 30 (40%) 0 (0%) 30                (25%)
Others 6 (8%) 14 (30%) 20                (17%)
Total messages 75 (100%) 46 (100%) 121 (100%)
Ideology Inter-ideological 0 (0%) 17                (4%) 17                (3%)
Intra-ideological 16            (9%) 25                (6%) 41                (7%)
Non-ideological/personal 160          (91%) 400              (90%) 560              (91%)
Total messages 176          (100%) 442              (100%) 618              (100%)
Emotional 279 (159%) 1086 (246%) 1365 (221%)
     Positive sentiment 69 (39%) 428 (97%) 497 (80%)
     Positive emotionality 22 (13%) 235 (53%) 257 (42%)
     Optimistic/energetic 45 (26%) 118 (27%) 163 (26%)
     Negative sentiment 103 (59%) 190 (43%) 293 (47%)
     Anxiety 4 (2%) 18 (4%) 22 (4%)
     Anger 34 (19%) 71 (16%) 105 (17%)
     Sadness/depression 2 (1%) 26 (6%) 28 (5%)
Cognitive 133 (76%) 613 (139%) 746 (121%)
     Causation 12 (7%) 57 (13%) 69 (11%)
     Reflection 21 (12%) 108 (24%) 129 (21%)
     Expectation 20 (11%) 99 (22%) 119 (19%)
     Limitation 21 (12%) 92 (21%) 113 (18%)
     Speculation 17 (10%) 112 (25%) 129 (21%)
     Conviction 42 (24%) 145 (33%) 187 (30%)







 In addition to the content analysis, co-word analysis described the overall 
discourse generated in the two groups (see Figure 7). People’s Command had four main 
clusters of discourse. The largest cluster colored in orange was about the group itself, the 
“wildfire” (a shared metaphor of offline gatherings or rallies), and criticisms against the 
government. The second cluster in red was about rallies taken place in Seoul, Chuncheon, 
Cheongju, and Gangwon. The other two clusters in lime and in green were about 
comments written by the chairperson of the Welfare State Society and about recruiting 
people.  
Hope Republic had three main clusters and five other smaller ones. The largest 
cluster in yellow was about criticizing the government’s decision to build a naval base 
near Gangjung town in Jeju Island, which can cause environmental problems and threaten 
the livelihood of divers who sell sea creatures, and about asking for donations to help this 
town. The pink cluster was about asking the group members to support a candidate for 
the presidential election of Hope Republic. In the black cluster, people were talking about 
the importance of listening and respecting and supporting themselves. The other smaller 
clusters cover discourses on the resurgence of the moderate party (blue cluster), problems 
related to Japan (lime cluster), offline gatherings (green cluster), and requests for 
participation in the poll (red cluster).  
 As noted in the content analysis, co-word analysis shows that Hope Republic had 
emotionally positive words, such as “jubilant,” “joy,” “good,” and “enthusiasm,” more 





groups were focused on their political topics. In addition, name-calling or uncivil words 











Figure 7: Co-Word Analysis of People’s Command (above) and Hope Republic (below) 
Note: Nodes were colored based on their group association. The size of nodes indicates the occurrence frequency of a given word. Only words that 





Influence of emotional and cognitive forms of discourse (H3 & RQ3-2) 
The results of negative binomial regression demonstrate that negative emotion 
accounted for a larger amount of variance in the frequency of being retweeted than 
positive emotion, as denoted in the incremental change of Nagelkerke R
2 
from 0.9% to 
4.2% (see Table 10). Thus, discourses with negative emotion were more likely to have 
social influence than those with positive emotion, providing support for H3-1. Among 
emotional variables, only anger was a significant predictor of retweetability. A one unit 
change in the occurrence of words that express anger is expected to produce about 2.5
25
 
more retweets, while holding all other variables constant. Anxiety, which has been a 
variable of interest in the literature along with anger, was not statistically significant, but 
the negative sign of its coefficient suggests that discourses that conveyed anxiety were 
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 Since the coefficients of negative binomial regression are the logs of expected counts, they 
need anti-log transformation for interpretation. For anger variable, the coefficient .927 is 






Table 10: Results of Negative Binomial Regression Predicting Retweetability 
Note: Cell entries are coefficients of the negative binomial regression with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
  
Comparing the emotional form of discourse to the cognitive form, this study 
found that the latter (30.4%) provided a better explanation for retweetability than the 
former (19.2%), thus failing to reject H3-2. Among cognitive variables, causation, 









Group 1.114 *** 1.052 *** 1.068 *** Group 1.068 ***
(.180) (.189) (.191) (.171)
(Constant) -.776 *** -.743 *** -.850 *** (Constant) -.600 ***
(.107) (.133) (.141) (.117)
Positive sentiment .025 .034 Causation -1.477 **
(.147) (.145) (.502)
Positive emotionality -.210 -.167 Reflection -.029
(.178) (.175) (.204)
Optimistic/energetic .166 .148 Expectation -.939 **
(.185) (.186) (.274)
Negative sentiment -.147 Limitation -1.096 ***
(.173) (.298)
Anxiety -.258 Speculation .030
(.542) (.245)




Model χ2 37.360 *** 39.825 *** 51.867 *** Model χ2 86.048 ***
Nagelkerke R
2
(%) 14.1 15.0 19.2 Nagelkerke R
2
(%) 30.4
     R
2
change (%) 0.9 4.2
N 478 478 478 N 478






discourse explained causes and effects, conveyed expectation, or acknowledged 
limitations, the less likely it was passed along, as denoted by the negative signs of the 
coefficients. However, when the discourse was filled with conviction, its retweetability 
increased by 1.6 times
26
, ceteris paribus.  
For example, the followings are the messages that were widely shared in People’s 
Command (above) and Hope Republic (below):  
There is a meeting with activists of the progressive camp today. I just read the 
comment written by Mr. Lee, the chair of <Welfare State Society>. We need to 
proceed with the consolidation of the opposition parties for a single party. The 
public opinion is increasing.
27
 
I support Mr. Yang Gwang-mo. ^_^  Please stand up for the moderate party. The 
moderate party should stand at the center of Hope Republic and coordinate both 
conservative and liberal parties in order to make further improvement.
28
 
Note: Translation from Korean to English is provided by the author. The original is 
provided in the footnote. 
Source: Twitaddons.com 
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 exp(.482)=1.619 
27오늘은 사무국회의에 민주진보진영 활동가들과의 모임이 있습니다. 홈피에서 오늘에야 
<복지국가 쏘사이어티> 이상이대표의 글을 봤는데 야권단일정당으로 가야한다 대세가 
잡혀가네요 
28양광모님을 지지합니다. ^_^ 중도당을 일으켜 세워주세요~ 중도당이 희망광화국에 





INTERACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT (RQ3-2) 
People’s Command and Hope Republic did not have any interaction with 
@bluehousekorea. They did not send messages to any 138 governmental Twitter 
accounts. This result shows that even though people had a channel to directly 
communicate with the government, they did not use it.  
 The ego network of @bluehousekorea depicts that it communicated with only 
seven citizens during the study period (see Figure 8). The other users with whom 
@bluehousekorea interacted were all government agencies such as the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology (@mest4u) and the Ministry of Land, Transport and 
Maritime Affairs (@Korea_Land) and government projects such as the Four Major 
Rivers Restoration project (@save4rivers) and One Week for the Earth 
(@greenweek2011) campaign. The most mentioned Twitter account by 
@bluehousekorea was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trades (@mofatkr), followed 
by that of the Prime Minister (@PrimeMinisterKR). Overall, over 70% of interactions 








Figure 8:  Ego Network of @bluehousekorea 
Note: The circle at the center is the Blue House. Blue triangles indicate government agencies and 
government projects, and green squares denote ordinary citizens. The width of edges is 
proportionate to the number of mentions sent between @bluehousekorea and the given node.  
 
Many Tweet messages were about introducing new policies, publicizing the 
government’s achievements, and briefing the president’s official schedule. This tendency 
was denoted by echoing what other government agencies announced on Twitter and in 
words such as “about,” “through,” “for,” “today,” and “scheduled to” which appeared in 
the Tweet messages at least more than five times (see Figure 9). Words such as “we,” 
“all”, “everybody’s,” and “nation” were also frequently used by @bluehousekorea, which 






Messages exchanged with ordinary citizens were about acknowledging the 
president’s warm consideration of the Korean army, asking what types of digital devices 
the president uses, and encouraging undergraduate students’ campaign on Dokdo, the 
island that is under conflict with Japan in regards to its territoriality. None of them were 
criticizing the government. In addition, “the President” appeared very frequently in the 
Tweet messages, which suggests that it was not the President himself who managed 
@bluehousekorea but his staff members.  
 
 
Figure 9:  Words Most Frequently Appeared in @bluehousekorea 
Note: These words are those that occurred more than five times in @bluehousekorea. The size of 
the character is proportionate to the occurrence frequency of a given word.   
 
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS 
 Based on the cases of People’s Command and Hope Republic, the present study 
examined the structural quality of the flow of information, the content of discussions, and 





In terms of the network structure, the discussion network was centralized on a few 
participants and relatively inclusive in engaging many group members. However, there 
was no statistical indication of equitability. Each group had five opinion leaders who 
participated in many discussions and facilitated the flow of information. Interaction 
between opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders took place more than that among non-
opinion leaders, which suggests that the flow of information was subject to the two-step 
flow of communication from external sources of information to opinion leaders and then 
to other participants. This flow of information was different from the flow of influence in 
that the former had more star-based, centralized connections compared to a random 
distribution than the latter. However, when considering the frequency of messages being 
passed along, it was mostly opinion leaders’ messages that were intensively spread. In 
this regard, opinion leaders were influentials, but they were not content creators. 
In terms of the discourse, sources of information were confined to images and 
messages created by like-minded fellow citizens, and discussions were more 
ideologically like-minded than ideologically dissimilar in both People’s Command and 
Hope Republic. Emotional expressions prevailed over cognitive expressions, and anger 
was more salient than anxiety. With regards to the cognitive process, causation was least 
employed and conviction was mostly used in the discussion, which suggests that less 
analytical and more assertive forms of discourse were present in the discussions. 
Examining the discussion itself, three or four clusters of discourses were revealed in both 
groups. Close reading of these clusters shows that discussions were not decaying into 





negative content had greater social influence than positive content, and content with 
anger was more widely spread than content with anxiety. When the content conveyed the 
conviction of the author, it was highly shared. 
In terms of the interaction with the government, participants of People’s 
Command and Hope Republic did not communicate with either @bluehousekorea or 
other e-government outlets. Only a few citizens sent @bluehousekorea messages, far 
from what one might consider to be the practice of citizenship. As noted in the discourse 
of @bluehousekorea, the government appropriated Twitter as a tool for information 














Chapter 5:  Discussion and Conclusion 
RETHINKING THE HABERMASIAN PUBLIC SPHERE IN ONLINE PUBLIC FORA 
In ‘The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere’ (Habermas 1989), 
Habermas lamented the degeneration of the public sphere along with the decline in the 
quality of discourse as a corollary to the increase in the quantity of participation in the 
public sphere. The wider participation in the public sphere entailed the loss of common 
ground and split the public sphere into two groups such as minorities of specialists and 
majorities of uncritical consumers. Habermas argued that this transformation has led to 
the decay of the public sphere into an arena for advertising by states and corporate actors 
and into the domination of party politics, rather than rational and critical debate by the 
public (Calhoun, 1992).  
Based on the results of the present study, online public fora as exemplified by 
People’s Command and Hope Republic were far from the Habermasian public sphere. 
Instead of the free flow of information from many to many as enabled by the 
development of information and communication technologies, the flow of information 
was between a few and many. A few individuals identified as opinion leaders were 
influentials whose remarks were highly passed along by others. Discussions were based 
on like-minded sources, more intra-ideological than inter-ideological, and more 
emotional than cognitive. Rather than analytical, causal discourses, discourses that 
convey conviction or anger were prevalent. From the Habermasian perspective, these 





and emotional discourses of like-minded people, confirming the degeneracy argument 
above.  
However, before making an assertion that the public sphere is in decline, can one 
consider that the form of the public sphere has been transformed from what Habermas 
defined? Loader and Mercea (2011, p.760) argued that “the Habermasian model was 
incongruent with the contemporary political and social culture of many societies.” Unlike 
17th and 18th century European society, in the contemporary era a large number of 
people, whether or not they share similar socioeconomic status, have political 
conversations in the virtual space. The community structure has been transformed from a 
‘little box’ bound to local neighbors, to ‘glocalization’ connecting long-distance 
relationships, and finally to ‘networked individualism’ freed from geographical 
restriction (Wellman, 2002). Networked individualism has led to the emergence of the 
networked public sphere where the public has more interpersonal relations and more 
communicative power than before.  
This change has implications for the potential of online public fora as a public 
sphere or many delimited public spheres. First, compared to the historical public sphere, 
the enhanced communicative power contributes to the increasing communicative 
reflexivity that Habermas argued is a main constituent of the public sphere (Friedland et 
al., 2006). In the present study, participants of online public fora distributed others’ 





neither digressed from politics nor degraded to small talk, as visualized in the clusters of 
discourses shared in the online public fora.  
Second, increased “traversability” — easing the transition between reading news 
media and joining online public fora — can also be regarded as another aspect of online 
public fora likely to constitute the public sphere (Brundidge, 2010b).  In the current case, 
the hyperlinked content embedded in messages helped participants to traverse different 
sources and modes of communication.  
Third, online political discourse moves through the viral capability of the 
technology, and this daily civic engagement sometimes accompanies a massive 
repercussion from the public and entails institutional responses (e.g. Strover & Choi, 
2012). Participants of People’s Command and Hope Republic passed along messages 
with which they agreed and attempted to form public opinions, not only within the group 
but also outside the group.  
Lastly, as noted by Dahlgren (2005), online public fora have increased civic 
interaction and fostered civic cultures. Satire and parody in the form of either text 
messages or audio-visual content were frequently shared in online public fora, as in the 
cases of present study. This sharing of non-rational but emotional content can make 
people feel more knowledgeable about politics and contribute to increasing political 
participation (Hoffman & Young, 2011). Moreover, according to the citizen 
communication mediation model (Shah et al., 2005) and O-S-R-O-R model (Cho et al., 





Considering the growing political apathy in the contemporary era, online public fora, 
especially based on SNSs, can increase the accessibility of ordinary citizens to political 
discourse and garner their attention to politics.   
Based on the research results, the characteristics of the networked public sphere 

















 Habermasian public sphere Networked public sphere 
 
Form  Face-to-face discussion 
 Bourgeois (male, white, rich) 
 
 
 Geographically bounded 
participation 
 











 Mediated discussion via online 
 Anybody (who have access to the 
technology and skills to join online 
fora) 
 Less restriction on participation 
with less temporal and spatial 
constraints 
 Presence of a few individuals who 
contribute to a large portion of 
discussion 
 Communicative reflexivity of 
reminding and referring to others’ 
opinions 
 Traversability of easing reading 
news and joining participation 
 Viral capability of the technology 
to broaden the basis of support and 
form public opinions 
 
Substance  Rational-critical discourse 
 Formal speech 
 
 Appeal to the reason 
 Literary production as a source or 
subject of discussion  
 Diverse opinions 
 Authoritative criticism by 
bourgeois which draw attention 





 Promotion of “high” culture 
 Deliberative democracy 
 Emotional/expressive discourse 
 Informal expression such as parody 
and satire 
 Appeal to the emotion 
 Fellow citizens’ opinions as a 
source or subject of discussion 
 Like-minded opinions 
 Negligible attention from and 
responsiveness of the government. 
Instead, participants as ordinary 
citizens attempt to form public 
opinions or actively participate in 
voting to indirectly influence 
policy-making decisions. 
 Promotion of civic cultures 
 Participatory democracy 
 






Being obsessed with the Habermasian notion of the public sphere, we tend to 
disregard other modes of communication except deliberation and have blind faith in 
rationalization. Habermas’s viewpoint is based on the proposition that “every ‘competent 
speaker’ should participate, rather than every possible one” (Neuman, Bimber, & 
Hindman, 2011). Contrary to Habermas, Bryce (1888) argued that sentiment, rather than 
reasoning, can contribute to making the ‘right’ political judgment. This might be one of 
the reasons that political communication research started to pay attention to emotions. 
The dark side of deliberation also was found by Mutz (2006), who observed that people 
having cross-cutting exposure to different opinions tended to participate less in politics 
than people having selective exposure to homogeneous opinions. By acknowledging that 
rational deliberation is not the only means to constitute the public sphere and achieve 
democratic ends such as civic engagement, social capital, and feelings of community, we 
can expand the theoretical usefulness of the concept “public sphere.” 
Although deliberative theory is full of inspiring and promising ideas, researchers 
should be under no obligation to “make it work” if the conditions under which it 
is beneficial turn out to be rare. If there is an easier, more efficient way to achieve 
some of these same ends, scholars should be open to these possibilities (Mutz, 
2008, p.529). 
Why, then, at this particular moment, is the rethinking of the public sphere 
important? Numerous large and small online public fora, such as People’s Command and 
Hope Republic, are created to share thoughts and express voices on specific topics, which 
can be theorized as “accelerated pluralism” (Bimber, 1998). This phenomenon has been 
explored in the context of social movement theory (Della Porta & Diani, 2006) or online 





activities as temporary incidents rather than a daily continuity. The every-day political 
discussion on the Internet is subsumed under the process of online activism and has not 
yet garnered much significance. This might be because, from the Habermasian 
perspective, online public fora are not public spheres but simply public spaces.  
However, based on the research results, online public fora are not public spaces 
where everybody can make a rant and which are not conducive to democratic process and 
only function as emotional ventilation, although they do not constitute deliberative public 
spheres. In these online public fora, the credibility of the message itself was considered 
important; cognitive discourses had greater social influence than emotional discourses; 
discussions were not trivialized to personal talk; and uncivil words were rarely stated. 
Different from the deliberative public sphere grounded on the information-based 
citizenship, online public fora are another form of public spheres premised on the notion 
of the rights-based citizenship. Schudson (1992, p.49) argues that “our use of digital 
media may be imprisoned by a concept of democracy that is a century old.” If the public 
sphere embraces not only ‘rational deliberation’ but also ‘emotional remarks’ (not 
including name-calling and uncivil remarks), if the public sphere favors not only ‘elite 
discourse’ framed by mass media but also ‘grassroots opinions’ in online fora, and if the 
public sphere is grounded not only on ‘deliberative democracy’ but also on ‘participatory 
democracy,’ the potential of online public fora might gain attention.  
 The distinctions between “deliberative public spheres (or deliberative democracy)” 





these two intermingle with each other in reality. Habermas simply posits a multiplicity of 
ideas and critiques proposed by individuals in the public sphere, but, in reality, there are 
underlying social struggles to draw public attention to the matters of concern against the 
dominant ideology or hegemonic powers that mostly take advantage of framing public 
discourse (Calhoun, 1992). As a result of these struggles, people can get their agenda on 
the table for further political discourses and decisions. In the present study, participants 
of online public fora passed along like-minded messages mostly written by opinion 
leaders. This activity can be regarded as partisan but contributes to deliberation by 
increasing the input of ideas and opinions in the public sphere of many public spheres. 
This inseparable relation between deliberative and participatory democracy needs to be 
considered in a re-conception of the public sphere, which embraces not only rational-
critical deliberation in a formalized environment but also expressive discourse in 
informal, online fora; both should be regarded as legitimate components of a public 
sphere.  
The negligible interaction between online public fora and the e-government outlet 
in the present analysis might have stemmed partly from relegating online public fora to a 
status as a public space rather than a public sphere and from using social network tools by 
the government for information transmission rather than civic interaction. Instead of 
human interaction between ordinary citizens and public authorities, media interaction 
between citizens and e-government outlets was facilitated. Recently, acknowledging the 
power of online political discourse, many politicians have established online channels to 





sphere to interact with citizens, not as a public space to uni-directionally transmit 
information, online public fora in theory can increase the responsiveness of 
representation by making greater voices in the agenda.  
In the arena of new politics, the Internet becomes not only relevant but central: It 
is especially the capacity for the “horizontal communication” of civic interaction 
that is paramount. (Dahlgren 2005, 155) 
As a complementary way to analyze and understand political interaction in online 
public spheres, I propose that we treat political discussion not just in terms of its 
rational communicative qualities, but also as a form of practice integrated within 
more encompassing civic cultures. (Dahlgren 2005, 157) 
As supported by several scholars (Dahlgren 2005; Shah et al. 2005), perhaps, it is not the 
nature of the discussion but the discussion or interaction itself that might be important for 
having lively public spheres.  
In order to reduce the incongruence between the theory and the reality, this study 
proposes we re-consider the public sphere as a realm in which both deliberative and 
participatory democracy and both deliberation and emotional expression co-exist. 
Starting from here, we can find a way to develop the functioning of online public spheres 
as a bridge between civil society and institutions, rather than relegating them to the status 
of decayed echo chambers perturbing the democratic process. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This section provides theoretical implications in the two-step flow of 





structure/context, multi-level, and quantitative/qualitative approaches, and practical 
implications of e-government development.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
Two step flow of communication theory 
 The two-step flow of communication had once lost its luster because of the 
difficulty of empirically testing the theory in a political communication context and 
because of the technological development that enabled messages to be sent directly to the 
target audience without any social mediation. The latter phenomenon was hypothesized 
as the one-step flow of communication by Bennett and Manheim (2006) who speculated 
on the demise of the two-step flow theory. However, several scholars (Mutz & Young, 
2011; Thorson & Wells, 2012) envisioned the resurgence of the two-step flow of 
communication in SNSs, which was observed in the present study. This study identified 
the two-step flow of communication in online public fora with the presence of opinion 
leaders. What is different from the traditional theory that posits the flow from mass media 
to opinion leaders and then to lay people is that it is not only the mass media but external 
information sources, including the Internet and content produced by fellow citizens, that 
were engaged in the flow of information.  
Along with the flow of information, the flow of influence was another issue that 
stemmed from the two-step flow theory. Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) discussed “personal 





together. Seeing this lacunae, the current study examined the two and found that the flow 
of information was likely to be more centralized around a fewer individuals than the flow 
of influence, by comparing each of these two to random distributions. This result is 
different from what could be expected from the literature. Inspired by the previous 
studies that people retweet those whom they regard as reliable and credible (Recuero et 
al., 2011), the influence network could be more centralized than information network; 
this turned out not to be supported in the current analysis. This somewhat counter-
intuitive result is understandable if influence comes from not the reliability or credibility 
of an individual but that of retweeted messages and if information is exchanged with an 
individual whom one considers familiar and well-known as information sources. Both 
networks were not significantly cliquish compared to random networks, which means 
they were less likely to be closed or fragmented into small cliques. 
Opinion leaders were found to have social influence by having their messages 
spread by others. Their messages were frequently retweeted, which means that they were 
shared not only by participants of People’s Command and Hope Republic but also by the 
followers of these participants. Opinion leaders’ social influence supported by 
technological affordance (the network) allowed the leaders to have greater power in 
forming and informing public opinions. However, opinion leaders were not media 











 In the literature, there were mixed findings in regards to the selective exposure 
phenomenon, one supporting Sunstein’s (2007) echo-chamber argument, the other 
finding online inadvertent encounters with dissimilar opinions. The results of the present 
study are in line with the former, considering that the sources and ideological 
perspectives of the content were tilted to one side, although this does not necessarily 
mean that participants intentionally avoid conflicting content (Garrett, 2009). The 
prevalence of like-minded content might exist partly because the current analysis was 
based on discussions made within a group despite the group’s openness to everybody, as 
well as because the phenomenon of selective exposure to congenial opinions is more 
common than that of intentional avoidance to dissimilar opinions. 
In addition, emotional reaction appeared to be related to the perception of the 
hostility in the online environment. While negative emotion was prevalent in People’s 
Command, positive emotion was more common in Hope Republic, which reminds 
Ragsdale’s explanation (1991) that one’s emotional valence is related to one’s perception 
of the environment; Positive emotion stems from one’s successful control of the 
environment, whereas negative emotion arises from the threat in the environment. 
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 Content created by opinion leaders was, for instance, lengthy text messages asking opinions of 





Considering that the People’s Command argued for the consolidation of the opposition 
parties against the ruling party, they might feel the political environment to be hostile, 
which leads them to have negative, even defensive, emotion. Unlike People’s Command, 
Hope Republic operated a mock National Assembly with the participants enrolled in 
conservative, moderate, and liberal parties, which allowed them to realize the political 
environment that they pursue. This idealized environment might have led them to share 
positive emotion.  
Moreover, as predicted by the affective intelligence theory (Marcus et al., 2011), 
emotional reactions were likely to be associated with the selective exposure to congenial 
opinions. In both groups, anger was expressed more than anxiety among negative 
emotions. As reviewed in the literature (MacKuen et al., 2010; Marcus & MacKuen, 
1993), anxiety encourages people to seek more information, even contrary to their own 
opinions, whereas anger limits their search to information that reinforces their original 
viewpoints or even deters searching itself. The prevalence of anger over anxiety seems to 
be intertwined with the inclination in the sources of information, heavily referring to like-
minded others’ messages and civic groups. 
Lastly, this study compared emotional to cognitive components contained in 
messages, which rarely has been addressed in the previous research on political 
communication. The result suggests that cognitive components provided better 
explanation for the spread of messages than emotional components. In particular, 





causation, limitation, or expectation. This result resonates with Huffaker (2010) who 
found assertiveness to be a significant predictor of triggering replies, creating 
conversation, and diffusing languages. Among emotional components, messages with 
anger were more influential than those with anxiety. These imply that assertive and 
strong claims had greater repercussions in online public fora than analytical, deliberative, 
and positive remarks, which might be another indication of partisan-oriented discourse.  
In sum, the present study contributes to the literature by empirically confirming 
the presence of the two-step flow of communication in online public fora and testing the 
difference between the flow of information and the flow of influence, both of which have 
been under-examined in previous studies. In addition, this study broadens the realm of 
research on political communication by exploring not only sources and ideological 
perspectives but also emotional and cognitive aspects in discussions.    
 
Methodological Implications 
Currently, many studies in diverse disciplines explore the large-scale data, so-
called “big data,” which is obtainable through search engines and SNSs. This big-data 
frenzy has been criticized as being potentially meaningless and valueless without the 
consideration of context (boyd & Crawford, 2011). In agreement with this criticism, the 
present study examined not only the network structure but also the context by 





While most political communication studies used surveys that rely on respondents’ 
memories of content shared or contact with others, this study was based on actual 
discourse appeared in discussions. With actual discourse, it was able to examine the 
selective exposure phenomenon as well as emotional and cognitive components 
embedded in the discourse. This approach of using actual discourse freed the research 
from the self-report bias that stems from asking survey respondents to go through 
cognitive processing to define their own emotional or cognitive states.  
In addition to the combination of network analysis and content analysis, a multi-
level approach was adopted for network analysis and a mixed-method approach for 
content analysis. The flow of information was explored at macro, meso, and micro levels 
of analysis, which allowed this study to explore the discussion network in depth from the 
overall structure to dyadic relationships and then to individuals. In regards to content 
analysis, not only a quantitative approach but also a qualitative approach visualized the 
semantic clusters of actual content as well as categorized and quantified the content.  
While previous studies on political communication mostly relied on one approach 
— surveys, ethnographic approaches, content analyses, or panel studies, diverse methods 
were employed here to complement each other; structure/context, multi-level, and 
quantitative/qualitative analyses add depth to a single method or level of analysis. Given 
that there is no perfect method, this study, through a triangulation approach, was able to 








The interaction between participants of People’s Command and Hope Republic 
and the e-government outlet did not take place even though the technology facilitates this 
interaction. It can be interpreted that people have low confidence in the government’s 
responsiveness to their requests. Valenzuela et al. (2012) found that SNSs use was 
closely related with political participation, whether or not SNSs users expected 
governmental changes. Participants of the two groups here might not have expected to 
interact with the public authorities, but might have valued the Twitter-verse as a place for 
interaction with fellow citizens. 
The negligible communication between @bluehousekorea and ordinary citizens 
might also result from the government’s use of Twitter as a tool for information 
transmission rather than for interaction, as noted in Wigand (2000). It seemed that the 
interaction between public authorities and private citizens was not activated in the 
Twitter-verse, in spite of the recent news report on the government’s prompt response to 
civil requests sent to its Twitter account (Paek, 2012).Chadwick (2003) envisioned that e-
government can provide citizens an opportunity to directly influence policy-making 
decisions, but this was not evident in the present study. Despite the decline of temporal 
and physical distance via the Internet, the end of distance between public authorities and 
private citizens has yet to come.    
Layne and Lee (2001) proposed four stages of e-government development: First, 
cataloguing downloadable information; second, providing electronic transactions of 





and fourth, horizontally integrating systems across different functions for citizens’ one-
stop shopping. These stages are mostly focused on improving transparency and reliability 
of government procedures and enhancing citizens’ convenience by facilitating online 
transactions. It is time to consider increasing interactivity with citizens as the fifth stage 
of e-government development, which was found to be the most critical factor in people’s 
overall e-government satisfaction in the survey results of Welch et al. (2005).  
 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 As is often the case with network analysis, this study has the limitation intrinsic to 
generalizing the results of two cases. However, it examined the dynamics of discussion 
networks and attempted to find commonalities of those two, enhancing generalizability 
within certain bounds. Second, the automated analysis of the forms of content might have 
increased accuracy and reduced possible bias from coders, but it could be possible to 
miscode some words that had connotations different from their general meanings. Lastly, 
this study did not confirm whether its findings were unique to political discussion groups, 
since it lacked a reference case that was not centered on political discussions. This 
limitation can also be a suggestion for future research to explore discussion networks of 
groups with diverse topics and to find the unique characteristics of groups for political 
discussion — i.e. whether patterns are different in other types of groups.  
In addition, attribute information of each participant can enrich the current 





related to the source/ideology/form of content that one authors. As well, the impact of 
online opinion leaders and the effect of source/ideology/form of content in online 
political discussions on the formation of public opinions call for more studies. A 
longitudinal analysis on the change of the discussion network can examine how the 
opinion leadership changes and how the emotional tone of discussions develops over time. 
Furthermore, the present study defined opinion leadership based on the flow of 
information in order to follow the conception of the two-step flow of communication 
model, but a composite measure of both the flow of information and the flow of influence 
can contribute to identifying opinion leaders, which might better capture the reality. 
Lastly, further research needs to be done on the interactivity of e-government beyond its 
transparency and transaction on which most e-government research has focused. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Political discussions in social media appear not to be based on many-to-many 
interaction, but led by a few individuals whom we can define as opinion leaders, 
accounting for a large portion of discussions and exerting social influence on others. It 
seemed that the flow of information is more centralized on a few individuals than the 
flow of influence. This result implies that people tend to exchange information with 
whom they commonly regard as information sources and that influence stems from not 
the reliability of an individual but that of a message. Both information and influence 





discussions were more emotional and partisan-oriented with anger and conviction 
embedded, rather than deliberative and rational. Assertive discourses were more 
influential. People relied on like-minded opinions of fellow citizens, not on the media. 
This representation of online political discussion is far from the traditional form 
of the public sphere defined by Habermas, but depicts the characteristics of the 
networked public sphere. By sharing ideas, validating each other’s thoughts, and 
spreading opinions, people are engaged in the process of forming public opinions, 
although this process does not yet include the involvement of the government. The 
emotional, provocative claims and audiovisual cues shared in online political discussions 
can draw attention to politics. Especially, social media that facilitate civic interaction and 
engage large number of people have a potential to enhance the general public’s interest in 
politics. The positive effect of social media on voter turn-out rates found in a recent study 
(Bond et al., 2012) suggests how political discussions in social media can reduce political 
apathy which has been a major problem in many democratic societies.  
Although deliberative discussions based on diverse ideological perspectives and 
sources of information are not common in political discussions in social media, it does 
not necessarily mean that the latter has no democratic value. Social media can function as 
networked public spheres where public opinions are formed and as one of indicators of 
public opinions, complementing the limitation of the mass-media-based public sphere 







Appendix 1: Coding scheme for content analysis 
 
Sources of content (Hyperlinks) 
1. User-generated content 
 User-generated content is sub-classified into the following categories 
based on objects toward which hyperlinks direct. For instance, if 
hyperlinks connect to SNSs, the source of content is coded as 13. SNSs, 
even though SNSs include both video clips and images. 
11. Video clips 
o hyperlinks directed toward video clips 
12. Images 
o hyperlinks directed toward images 
13. SNSs (texts) 
o hyperlinks directed toward SNSs  
2. Traditional media  
 Hyperlinks connecting with traditional media websites such as television, 
newspaper, magazine, and radio news sites. 
3. Net-based media 
 Hyperlinks linking to net-based news sites such as online grassroots media 
(e.g. ohmynews.com) and online newspaper sites (e.g. pressian.com). 
4. Government 
 Hyperlinks leading to homepages, blogs, and SNSs of the government, 
government officials, or government organizations such as Ministries and 
agencies. 
5. Civic groups 
6. Others 
 Hyperlinks connecting to websites not pertinent to the above categories. 
 Broken hyperlinks. 
 
Ideological perspectives of content (Tweet messages) 
1. Inter-ideological 
 Opinions not leaning towards liberal, progressive viewpoints 
 Conservative, pro-government opinions or moderate opinions  
2. Intra-ideological 
 Liberal, progressive opinions  
 Sometimes, anti-government, anti-conglomerates 
3. Non-ideological or personal 
 Anything not classified into 1 and 2 
 For instance, remarks opinionated but not ideological, facts, 



















actormoon 16.7% 20.0% flytosky7 0.5% 0.0% news2health 0.2% 0.0%
minorunit 8.8% 11.8% Gec8nom 0.5% 0.0% sin4clover 0.2% 0.0%
sarangbi 8.6% 21.0% girlonthesnowi 0.5% 0.0% skyubis 0.2% 0.0%
millionocracy 6.1% 16.9% hasungyun 0.5% 0.0% youtube 0.2% 0.0%
lkjae 4.9% 7.7% hdg124 0.5% 0.0% bonitamh 0.0% 0.0%
2sind2 4.9% 2.3% hnkim_ 0.5% 0.0% chiwoo82 0.0% 0.0%
61510410 3.4% 0.9% innokor 0.5% 0.0% coreacyc 0.0% 0.0%
hopeliberty 2.0% 0.1% iyoyang 0.5% 0.0% gamediller 0.0% 0.0%
kgh38 1.7% 0.0% JNJ729 0.5% 0.0% jjamjang00 0.0% 0.0%
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yijongseo 1.0% 0.4% PopeBByong 0.5% 0.0%
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luralatoo 0.7% 0.1% tovagi717 0.5% 0.0%
mhj412 0.7% 0.0% violetwd 0.5% 0.0%
o98765 0.7% 0.1% yhsgmo 0.5% 0.0%
oLzLssl 0.7% 0.1% yoku7474 0.5% 0.0%
ssunkim 0.7% 0.2% yoon15380 0.5% 1.7%
SunMoon_Jo 0.7% 1.7% bangyc 0.2% 0.0%
tjkweon 0.7% 0.3% citizen_kr 0.2% 0.0%
yangyoungki 0.7% 1.4% cliffree 0.2% 0.0%
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jmb 0.2% 0.0% expert0001 0.0% 0.0%
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LouiseKarl 0.2% 0.0% polkorea 0.0% 0.0%
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mkchai07 0.2% 0.0% Remonade1001 0.0% 0.0%
morningstartou 0.2% 0.0% stylesean 0.0% 0.0%
mroption 0.2% 0.0% The_coffee_haus 0.0% 0.0%
napolywoo 0.2% 0.0% TravelSketch 0.0% 0.0%
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Appendix 3.1: Goodness of fit results for PNet model of People’s Command 
 
 
Note: Parameters in bold were included in the model. 
 
Mention network Retweet network Mention network Retweet network
Parameters SE t-ratio SE t-ratio Parameters SE t-ratio SE t-ratio
reciprocity 4.45 -0.04 0.98 0.01 AT-C 16.67 -0.63 2.76 -0.69
2-in-star 568.86 -0.05 122.97 -0.05 AT-D 14.47 0.47 3.77 0.12
2-out-star 46.26 0.03 8.20 -0.02 AT-U 22.10 -0.02 5.86 -0.02
3-in-star 10473.46 -0.04 1387.98 -0.04 AT-TD 13.78 0.18 4.82 0.02
3-out-star 147.69 0.03 9.05 -0.03 AT-TU 21.46 -0.05 5.95 -0.03
path2 127.58 -0.31 50.73 -0.02 AT-DU 13.89 0.23 4.69 0.03
T1 2.40 -0.39 0.14 -0.13 AT-TDU 15.76 0.10 5.13 0.01
T2 17.19 -0.50 1.06 -0.25 A2P-T 107.44 -0.07 49.26 -0.04
T3 21.35 -0.56 1.63 -0.45 A2P-D 43.74 0.16 6.68 0.14
T4 16.69 -1.30 2.91 -0.16 A2P-U 499.47 -0.06 121.67 -0.03
T5 11.25 -0.45 1.03 -0.42 A2P-TD 69.12 0.00 25.66 -0.02
T6 18.78 -0.35 0.98 -0.40 A2P-TU 224.63 -0.08 69.36 -0.04
T7 101.29 -1.17 34.11 -0.54 A2P-DU 231.33 -0.04 59.18 -0.02
T8 59.93 0.07 4.56 -0.02 A2P-TDU 138.27 -0.07 45.47 -0.04
T9(030T) 30.39 -0.31 7.07 -0.12 Std Dev in-degree dist 1.05 0.04 0.35 0.00
T10(030C) 9.12 -0.59 1.01 -0.66 Skew in-degree dist 0.81 0.68 0.51 0.28
Sink 3.98 0.04 2.08 0.03 Std Dev out-degree dist 0.30 0.13 0.11 0.04
Source 6.47 -0.02 3.87 0.03 Skew out-degree dist 0.77 0.75 0.53 0.28
Isolates 3.08 0.54 3.39 -0.03 CorrCoef in-out-degree dists 0.17 -0.37 0.17 0.02
AinS 15.12 -0.05 7.44 -0.03 Global Clustering Cto 0.13 -0.42 0.11 -0.15
AoutS 12.79 0.02 5.05 -0.02 Global Clustering Cti 0.02 -0.33 0.01 -0.12
AinS 15.12 -0.05 7.44 -0.03 Global Clustering Ctm 0.08 -0.11 0.05 -0.21
AoutS 12.79 0.02 5.05 -0.02 Global Clustering Ccm 0.04 -0.72 0.02 -0.74
Ain1out-star 24.17 0.19 6.16 1.42 Global Clustering AKC-T 0.08 -0.17 0.04 -0.10
1inAout-star 23.76 -1.25 20.72 -0.39 Global Clustering AKC-D 0.05 0.10 0.09 -0.09
AinAout-star 7.66 -0.07 3.55 0.67 Global Clustering AKC-U 0.01 -0.20 0.01 -0.04





Appendix 3.2: Goodness of fit results for PNet model of Hope Republic 
 
 
Note: Parameters in bold were included in the model. 
Mention network Retweet network Mention network Retweet network
Parameters SE t-ratio SE t-ratio Parameters SE t-ratio SE t-ratio
reciprocity 3.93 0.00 2.27 -0.07 AT-C 17.93 -0.03 8.48 -0.09
2-in-star 341.18 0.01 140.42 0.03 AT-D 20.59 0.12 8.71 0.03
2-out-star 114.55 0.00 22.26 -0.04 AT-U 14.27 0.61 8.40 0.15
3-in-star 5077.82 0.01 1826.28 0.04 AT-TD 18.80 0.06 9.02 -0.02
3-out-star 603.71 0.00 66.09 -0.03 AT-TU 15.47 0.27 8.89 0.04
path2 187.14 -0.08 74.86 -0.12 AT-DU 15.99 0.35 8.37 0.09
T1 4.16 -1.08 1.40 -0.83 AT-TDU 16.50 0.22 8.72 0.04
T2 27.20 -0.76 9.11 -0.59 A2P-T 187.46 0.02 72.99 -0.02
T3 30.70 -0.47 10.34 -0.38 A2P-D 98.53 0.16 19.47 0.21
T4 14.24 -0.45 5.67 -0.08 A2P-U 342.32 0.05 141.44 0.07
T5 18.90 -0.61 5.86 -0.59 A2P-TD 79.02 0.12 39.30 0.03
T6 28.36 0.51 8.41 0.18 A2P-TU 253.77 0.04 100.08 0.04
T7 170.98 0.21 59.38 0.30 A2P-DU 133.58 0.13 67.13 0.10
T8 90.87 -0.04 27.72 0.16 A2P-TDU 146.03 0.09 65.46 0.06
T9(030T) 37.53 -0.09 13.70 -0.20 Std Dev in-degree dist 0.66 0.10 0.33 0.09
T10(030C) 11.96 -0.25 4.13 -0.24 Skew in-degree dist 1.22 0.65 0.94 0.43
Sink 6.91 0.04 3.67 -0.05 Std Dev out-degree dist 0.30 0.06 0.11 0.00
Source 7.12 -0.05 5.13 0.03 Skew out-degree dist 0.46 -0.07 0.45 0.09
Isolates 4.58 -0.52 4.92 -0.14 CorrCoef in-out-degree dists 0.09 -0.40 0.08 -0.28
AinS 15.02 -0.03 8.36 0.05 Global Clustering Cto 0.03 -0.13 0.04 -0.19
AoutS 20.40 0.03 8.29 -0.04 Global Clustering Cti 0.05 -0.31 0.02 -0.28
AinS 15.02 -0.03 8.36 0.05 Global Clustering Ctm 0.04 -0.11 0.03 -0.18
AoutS 20.40 0.03 8.29 -0.04 Global Clustering Ccm 0.03 -0.25 0.02 -0.22
Ain1out-star 31.35 0.51 11.69 1.04 Global Clustering AKC-T 0.02 -0.13 0.02 -0.08
1inAout-star 25.52 0.22 14.97 0.67 Global Clustering AKC-D 0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.07
AinAout-star 5.36 0.74 3.98 1.69 Global Clustering AKC-U 0.02 -0.14 0.01 -0.07
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